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INTRODUCTION 
The Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis (the “Archdiocese” or the “Debtor”) 
submits this omnibus response to the five pleadings asserting legal objections to the 
Archdiocese’s Second Amended Plan of Reorganization [ECF No. 887 (the “Archdiocese 
Plan”)]. 
This memorandum is filed under Section 1128 of the Bankruptcy Code and this Court’s 
May 18 and June 15, 2017 orders.  Terms not otherwise defined in this memorandum are defined 
in accordance with the Archdiocese Plan or disclosure statement in support of the Archdiocese 
Plan [ECF No. 888 (the “Archdiocese Disclosure Statement”)], as appropriate.   
This response first addresses the objections raised in the memorandum submitted by the 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “UCC”) [ECF No. 1112 (the “UCC Memo”)] 
and then addresses the separate objections raised by North American Banking Company and 
Bremer Bank National Association (collectively, the “Mortgage Lenders”) [ECF Nos. 1101, 
1103], the Estate of Nancy J. Galatowitsch, [ECF No. 1105] and the Crosier entities [ECF No. 
1120].   
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None of the objections preclude confirmation of the Archdiocese Plan.  Instead, all of the 
objections either fail as a matter of law or implicate fact issues that cannot be resolved at this 
time.1
This response focuses solely on the objections to the Archdiocese Plan.  It does not 
address the UCC Plan or the “Modified Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of 
the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul and 
Minneapolis.” See ECF No. 1129.  By this late filing, the UCC attempts to address some, but not 
all, of the more obvious legal defects in the UCC Plan.  This course of action appears to be 
contrary to the Court’s order which clearly indicated that no exhibits, affidavits, or other 
evidence in support of a response to a plan objection would be permitted.  ECF No. 1090.  In 
fact, the Court clearly indicated at the hearing on June 15 that it did not “want to turn this into a 
moving target.  I am going to rule on the plans that have been filed.”  ECF No. 1095 (Hr’g 
Transcript, June 15, 2017) at 20.   
Moreover, the further amendment of the UCC Plan has not resolved several fatal legal 
objections to the UCC Plan and has, in fact, created new legal challenges that preclude 
confirmation.  Certain material changes to the UCC Plan may also necessitate re-solicitation in 
that, among other things, the UCC Plan now includes a limited supplemental injunction in favor 
of one of the carriers in the case.  The Archdiocese respectfully requests an opportunity to 
separately address the new legal issues raised by the UCC’s amendment. 
1 Many relevant facts are self-evident, established on the record or admitted. For all other factual 
assertions included in this Response, the Archdiocese is prepared to provide evidentiary support 
at the appropriate time and as directed by the Court.  
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UCC OBJECTIONS 
I. UCC OBJECTION NO. 1 FAILS:  THE ARCHDIOCESE PLAN SATISFIES THE 
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INCLUSION OF A CHANNELING 
INJUNCTION  
A. Courts within the Eighth Circuit have universally rejected the minority view 
that non-consensual, non-debtor injunctions are prohibited  
In its lead objection to the Archdiocese Plan, the UCC expressly acknowledges that 
channeling injunctions are permissible in appropriate circumstances.  UCC Memo at 4.  Indeed, 
in its otherwise ill-conceived and late-filed “Modified Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of 
Reorganization of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the Archdiocese of Saint 
Paul and Minneapolis,” the UCC admits that a channeling injunction is proper.  See ECF No. 
1129 at § 14.2(c) (including a limited supplemental injunction in favor of one of the insurance 
carriers).  Put simply, a channeling injunction represents the best and only vehicle for a fair and 
just global resolution of the claims in this case.  As detailed below, no global resolution of this 
case can be achieved and no Archdiocese insurance monies will be made available to Tort 
Claimants in the absence of a channeling injunction.  A channeling injunction is necessary and 
integral to any plan of reorganization in this case. 
The vast majority of federal circuits, including the First, Second, Third, Fourth Sixth, 
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits2 have determined that non-debtor releases are permissible under 
appropriate circumstances and uniformly reject the minority view, represented by decisions from 
the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits (the so-called “Prohibition Circuits”), that “11 U.S.C. 
§ 524(e) prohibits non-consensual third-party releases.”  UCC Memo at 3-4.  While the Eighth 
2 See, e.g., In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015); Nat’l 
Heritage Found., Inc. v. Highbourne Found., 760 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 
S.Ct. 961 (2015); In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., 519 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008); In re 
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 
F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2000); Monarch Life Ins. 
Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995).  
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Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet ruled on the permissibility of non-debtor releases, the 
leading test adopted by the majority of federal circuits was first articulated in Master Mortgage,
a 1994 bankruptcy decision from the Western District of Missouri.  In re Master Mortg. Inv. 
Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 935 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).   
In Master Mortgage, a federal bankruptcy court within the Eighth Circuit declined to 
follow the interpretations of the Prohibition Circuits, and in doing so, adopted the majority view 
that Section 524 “‘does not purport to limit or restrain the power of a bankruptcy court to 
otherwise grant a release of third parties.’”  Id. at 933 (quoting In re Specialty Equip. Co., 3 F.3d 
1043, 1047 (7th Cir.1993)); see also In re Richard Potasky Jeweler, Inc., 222 B.R. 816, 825 
(S.D. Ohio 1998) (“This leap of legal reasoning is unwarranted.”).  The Master Mortgage court 
further observed that Section 105 “is broadly written allowing all orders that are necessary and 
proper to effectuate a reorganization which may, at times, require the issuance of an injunction or 
release.”  Master Mortg., 168 B.R. at 934 (citing MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 
F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir.1988)). 
Subsequent to the Master Mortgage decision, every bankruptcy court within the Eighth 
Circuit that has addressed the permissibility of non-debtor releases has rejected the flawed 
reasoning of the Prohibition Circuits and has, instead, applied the “Master Mortgage factors” 
when assessing the permissibility of third-party releases.  See In re Riverbend Leasing LLC, 458 
B.R. 520 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2011); In re U.S. Fidelis, Inc., 481 B.R. 503 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 
2012); In re Hoffinger Industries, Inc. 321 B.R. 498 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).   
As the UCC impliedly acknowledges through its own analysis of Master Mortgage, there 
is no basis for this Court to deviate from the universal, well-reasoned approach of its sister courts 
within the Eighth Circuit.  
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B. Eighth Circuit courts consider the non-conjunctive Master Mortgage factors 
when determining whether to approve non-debtor releases 
Recognizing that non-debtor releases are heavily dependent upon the unique “factual 
contexts” of each case, the “Master Mortgage” test looks to five factors:  
(1) There is an identity of interest between the debtor and the third party, usually an 
indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is, in essence, a suit 
against the debtor or will deplete assets of the estate. 
(2)  The non-debtor has contributed substantial assets to the reorganization. 
(3) The injunction is essential to reorganization. Without [] it, there is little likelihood 
of success. 
(4) A substantial majority of the creditors agree to such injunction, specifically, the 
impacted class, or classes, has “overwhelmingly” voted to accept the proposed 
plan treatment. 
(5) The plan provides a mechanism for the payment of all, or substantially all, of the 
claims of the class or classes affected by the injunction. 
In re Master Mortg., 168 B.R. at 935. 
Contrary to the UCC’s erroneous contention that the Archdiocese “must meet all of the 
applicable requirements,” UCC Memo at 1, 10-11, these factors are neither exclusive nor 
conjunctive requirements, but simply provide guidance in the court’s determination of fairness.  
Id. (finding that there is no “rigid test” to be applied in every circumstance and that the five 
factors are neither exclusive, nor conjunctive).  Because the plan proponent need not prove the 
existence of all five Master Mortgage factors, they have been described as a “useful starting 
point.”  In re Charles St. African Methodist Episcopal Church of Boston, 499 B.R. 66, 100 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2013). 
As detailed below, when the Master Mortgage factors are applied to the unique 
circumstances of this bankruptcy case, they overwhelmingly support the issuance of a channeling 
injunction as embodied in the Archdiocese Plan.  The UCC’s contrary argument with respect to 
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each Master Mortgage factor, in addition to resting on faulty legal propositions, relies 
principally, if not entirely, on innuendo, speculation and a tortured interpretation of the 
applicable facts.  At a very minimum, the UCC’s objection implicates a myriad of material, 
disputed fact issues that cannot give rise to an order sustaining this purported “legal” objection as 
a matter of law.   
C. The Archdiocese Plan satisfies the Master Mortgage factors 
1. FACTOR 1:  The Archdiocese and the parishes share an identity of 
interest 
The first consideration, whether there is an identity of interest between the debtor and the 
non-debtor, is satisfied where suits against the non-debtor may deplete assets of the estate or give 
rise to indemnity or contribution claims against the debtor.  In re Master Mortg., 168 B.R. at 
937.  The UCC contends that the Archdiocese cannot show an identity of interests with the 
Protected Parties, in particular the parishes, because these entities have emphasized that they are 
“legally and operationally distinct from the Archdiocese.”  UCC Memo at 9.  This contention is 
baseless because it conflates legal separateness with identity of interest.  All non-debtor releases, 
by definition, concern entities that are legally separate and distinct from the debtor.  If they were 
legally and operationally indistinct from the debtor, then these entities would already be part of 
the debtor’s bankruptcy estate and there would be no need to consider the merits and utility of 
non-debtor releases.  
Consistent with this distinction, Master Mortgage counsels that the hallmark “identity of 
interest” between a debtor and non-debtor exists where a post-petition action against the non-
debtor may result in an indemnity or contribution claim against the debtor.  In Master Mortgage, 
the court determined that an identity of interest existed between the debtor and non-debtor where 
a settlement agreement created a right of contribution between the parties.  168 B.R. at 937.  The 
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court noted that “any post-petition action against [the non-debtor] would result in a right of 
contribution against [the debtor] Master Mortgage.  Such action would seriously affect Master 
Mortgage’s ability to successfully reorganize.”  Id.; see also In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 
187, on reconsideration, 464 B.R. 208 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (noting an identity of interest 
between the debtors and the settling parties where such parties “share[d] the common goal of 
confirming the [ ] Plan and implementing the [ ] Plan Settlement”). 
That is precisely the case here.  Because the parishes have asserted contribution claims 
against the Archdiocese arising out of Tort Claims involving clergy assigned by the Archdiocese, 
the Archdiocese undoubtedly shares an identity of interest with the parishes.  Contrary to the 
UCC’s suggestion, there is nothing “theoretical” about this interest.  It is undisputed that counsel 
for certain of the Tort Claimants have initiated state court litigations against a majority of the 
Archdiocese’s parishes (the “Parish Lawsuits”).  These Parish Lawsuits, on their face, assert 
claims arising from misconduct by clergy who were assigned to the parishes by the Archbishop.  
Each of these pending Parish Lawsuits concern the same Tort Claimants, the same alleged 
perpetrators, the same facts and the same allegations asserted against the Archdiocese in the Tort 
Proofs of Claim.  The parishes have asserted contribution and indemnity claims against the 
Archdiocese arising out of these Parish Lawsuits such that they are, in effect, indirect claims 
against the debtor.3
The UCC’s only retort – i.e., that these contribution and indemnity claims are 
“contingent” and thus statutorily disallowed under Section 502(e)(1)(B) – is without merit.4 See
3 These parishes also have claims against the Archdiocese carriers, including pursuant to Minn. 
Stat. § 60A.08, subd. 6. 
4  The Parish Committee has consistently taken the position that parish contribution and 
indemnity claims will not be discharged under Section 1141. The Parish Committee has also 
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UCC Memo at 10.  This same argument was advanced and rejected in In re Charles St. African 
Methodist Episcopal Church, 499 B.R. at 100-01.  In that case, like the UCC, the largest creditor 
of the debtor invoked Section 502(e)(1)(B) to argue that there was no identity of interest under 
Master Mortgage where a third party’s purported right of indemnification or contribution against 
the debtor remained contingent.  Id. at 100-01.  The court flatly rejected the creditor’s argument 
and concluded that the contingent contribution claim sufficiently supported an identity of interest 
between the debtor and the third party.  The court reasoned: 
The present contingency of [third party’s] claim is of no moment: a claim 
disallowed for contingency under § 502(e)(1)(B) can be reconsidered when it 
becomes fixed, see 11 U.S.C. § 502(j) (“[a] claim that has been ... disallowed may 
be reconsidered for cause”), and, upon reconsideration, would be determined and 
allowed or disallowed “the same as if such claim had become fixed before the 
filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(2).  
Id. at 101.   
This Court should reach the same conclusion here.   
But even if this Court were to conclude that the contribution claims, on their own, are 
insufficient to create an identity of interest, the Archdiocese would still satisfy this factor for 
reasons the UCC wholly ignores.  For instance, the Parish Lawsuits involve priests assigned by 
the Archdiocese.  Thus, these suits – which implicate the very same Tort Claims at issue in this 
bankruptcy case – will necessarily involve the Archdiocese in discovery and litigation.    
Equally important, the pending sexual abuse claims against the parishes will deplete 
assets of the estate.   
• First, each Catholic within the Archdiocese is a member of a parish.  The Archdiocese’s 
revenues primarily derive from parish assessments and donations from Catholics within 
its reach who are also members of specific parishes. 
argued that, even if the court rejects this view, Minnesota law allows the parishes to pursue a 
claim against the debtor’s insurers. 
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• Second, the Archdiocese and the parishes share an insurance fund, the GIF. Parishes 
will seek to fund their defense/indemnity out of the GIF (for claims after September 1, 
1980), thereby depleting monies that could be used for resolution of this case or 
Archdiocese defense/indemnity. 
• Third, parishes are co-insureds under numerous insurance policies, including all 
parishes under the 1980-1987 policies and Catholic Mutual policies 1987-present.  
Limits are shared on a per-occurrence basis (1980-1987 and pre-1980 policies) and in 
the aggregate (Catholic Mutual).  The majority rule is that an insurer may resolve the 
liability of one insured, in good faith, even if the result is that another insured is left 
without a defense and without remaining limits to pay a judgment.”  Duana J. Grage & 
Suzanne L. Jones, Settling with Limited Funds (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/articles/mayjune2012-
competing-files.html.  The minority view is that an insurer can be liable for bad faith if 
it pays indemnity to one insured to the detriment of another.  Id.  Regardless of whether 
the majority or minority rule applies, failure to include the parishes in the channeling 
injunction will reduce the policy limits available to the Archdiocese for Tort Claims.  
Finally, while parishes are separate and distinct corporate entities from the Archdiocese, 
from a religious and canonical perspective, they act in communion in carrying out the core 
missions of the Catholic Church.  The Archdiocese could not exist without viable parishes and 
the Catholic Church finds its most immediate and visible expression in its parishes.  It is in and 
through parishes that the Catholic Church lives locally in the home of the Faithful by acting as 
the center for worship, formation, spiritual growth and the pursuit of the Gospel and social 
Catholic missions. 
In light of the unique relationship between the Archdiocese and the parishes, and because 
the pending Parish Lawsuits arise out of the same facts and circumstances as the Tort Claims 
against the Archdiocese and will undoubtedly deplete assets of the estate, the identity of interest 
factor supports the issuance of a channeling injunction. 
2. FACTOR 2:  The parishes will contribute substantial assets to the 
reorganization under the Archdiocese Plan 
The second Master Mortgage factor looks to whether the non-debtor has contributed 
substantial assets to the reorganization.  In re Master Mortg., 168 B.R. at 937.  Citing an 
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inapposite decision from the Middle District of Florida, the UCC erroneously contends that 
“each recipient of a third-party” release must contribute substantial assets and that courts “have 
found a contribution to be ‘substantial’ where the contribution consists of most of the assets of 
the contributing party.”  UCC Memo at 8.  That is simply not the law in the Eighth Circuit.   
First, neither Master Mortgage, nor any court from the Eighth Circuit has ever required 
that each individual recipient of a non-debtor release separately contribute substantial assets in 
exchange for the channeling injunction.  While a few courts in other jurisdictions may have 
historically required separate or proportional contributions by each person or entity seeking a 
non-debtor release (see, e.g., In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1151-54 (D.C. Cir. 1986)), 
the better-reasoned and majority approach appears to analyze the proposed consideration in the 
aggregate.  For example, in In re Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. 377, 390 (D.N.J. 2000), the court 
upheld a release covering a laundry list of third parties based on the contribution of a single 
party, explaining “this court must determine only that sufficient compensation is being paid to 
the class, and need not speculate as to the appropriate contribution of each defendant.  The 
release of noncontributing defendants through a settlement agreement is no reason for 
disapproving the compromise.”  Id. at 428.5  The court added that “such injunctions and releases 
are customary and ordinary in large Chapter 11 cases.”  Id. at 406.  
Second, neither Master Mortgage, nor any other court within the Eighth Circuit, has 
defined “substantial” consideration to require an analysis of a non-debtor’s ability to pay, let 
alone direct that the contribution “consist of most of the [non-debtor’s] assets.”  UCC Memo at 
8.  Instead, bankruptcy courts within the Eighth Circuit assess contributions on a case-by-case 
5 While this release was technically decided in the settlement context, the funding agreement 
releasing the parties was “the essential vehicle by which the Debtors c[ould] obtain the funds 
needed to perform their monetary obligations under the Plan” and is thus substantially similar to 
the plan context.  Id. at 390.  
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basis and, in doing so, have found contributions to be substantial without any analysis of the non-
debtors’ respective assets or ability to pay.  See In re U.S. Fidelis, Inc., 481 B.R. at 520 (finding 
that the non-debtors “will substantially contribute to the orderly liquidation of the Debtor,” 
without describing what determines a “substantial contribution”).   
At least one recent decision has approved a non-debtor release without any monetary 
contribution by the released non-debtors.  Specifically, in In re Seaside Engineering & 
Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d 1070, 1079 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
confirmation of a plan of reorganization containing non-debtor releases in favor of former 
principals of the debtor who acted as key employees of the reorganized debtor.  The releases 
were approved even though the only contribution offered by the principals was their labor.  Id. at 
1080.6
Importantly, “the substantial contribution inquiry does not turn on whether the holders of 
the released claims receive consideration; [rather] it turns on whether the Debtors’ estates have 
received consideration.”  In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 555 B.R. 180, 292 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
6 In a similar case, the court determined that the services of third-party officers constituted 
insufficient consideration to justify a release, especially where the plan provides only for 
“minimal payment of claims of the class affected by the injunction.”  In re Exide Techs., 303 
B.R. 48, 73-74 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).  At the same time, the court noted that the contribution of 
tangible “assets” is not a requirement for this factor to be satisfied: 
I do not hold here that the price of a release of officers, directors and others must 
always involve the contribution of tangible “assets” or that efforts alone of 
officers and directors are never sufficient to warrant such a release. In this matter, 
the unsecured creditors’ overwhelming opposition to the proposed settlement, 
combined with the Debtors’ undervaluation of its worth and the minimal 
distribution to unsecured creditors, all make the proposed releases inappropriate. I 
note also that upon presentation of a consensual plan, in the absence of objection 
to the release/injunction provisions, or upon a more meaningful distribution to 
unsecured creditors, the Court may, appropriately, view such provisions in a 
different light.    
Id. at 74 n. 3 (emphasis added).  
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2016) (emphasis added).  In analyzing the sufficiency of the consideration, some courts have also 
considered whether the non-debtor’s contribution will “provide for certain distributions that 
would not have been made available but for these nondebtor parties’ contributions.”  In re XO 
Commc’ns, Inc., 330 B.R. 394, 437-38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).  Here, the contributions being 
provided by the Protected Parties – including insurance proceeds and their relinquishment of 
contribution claims and claims relating to the GIF – benefit the estate and would not be available 
“but for” the Protected Parties’ contributions. 
In addition to relying on an erroneous legal standard, the UCC’s contention that the 
parishes will not contribute substantial assets under the Archdiocese Plan is built upon an 
erroneous accounting of the contributions to be provided by the Protected Parties under the 
Archdiocese Plan.  Contrary to the UCC’s representation that the parishes will contribute “$0 of 
their own assets” and “only proceeds from their insurance policies” [UCC Memo at 8] the 
parishes will, in reality, provide the following substantial consideration in exchange for the 
channeling injunction: 
• Parishes are compromising all claims they have asserted against the Archdiocese, 
including: (i) their numerous contribution claims relating to the Tort Claims (which the 
parishes assert are viable post-discharged [ECF No. 1113]); (ii) claims relating to the 
GIF “loan of $12.9 million”; and (iii) breach of fiduciary duty claims relating to 
administration of the AMBP and GIF.  
• Under the Archdiocese Plan, the parishes are contributing $13.7 million in insurance 
proceeds.  Every parish with an insurance policy which may provide coverage for Tort 
Claims will sell such policy and contribute all proceeds from that sale to the Trust.  The 
result is that, going forward, the parishes will not have insurance coverage for those 
periods. 
• All parishes are giving up their coverage for any type of claim under the 1980-1987 
policies and releasing Catholic Mutual for liability for Tort Claims.  Every parish that is 
an insured under other insurance policies issued to the Archdiocese is likewise giving 
up any claims it has under such policy.  Archdiocese Plan § 5.6(b)(2); Ex. N. 
• $5-6 million of the GIF is being used to fund the Trust.  The parishes will make 
contributions to the GIF so as to ensure that this amount of money is available to fund 
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the Trust.  Additionally, parishes are giving up claims they may have to a share of the 
GIF that is being used to fund the Archdiocese Plan. 
Collectively, the millions of dollars of consideration provided by the parishes in 
exchange for the channeling injunction is more than substantial.  This is especially true in light 
of the parishes’ realistic limited exposure and likely prospects that they will obtain a dismissal of 
the Parish Lawsuits seeking to impose liability for negligent hiring, retention or supervision of 
clergy.  Importantly, respondeat superior claims are barred by the statute of limitations and were 
specifically not included within the scope of claims revived by the Minnesota Child Victims Act.  
Minn. Stat. § 541.73 (2013).  As for negligence-based claims, no Minnesota court has ever 
adjudicated liability against a parish corporation for alleged abuse by a clergy member.  And it is 
uncontested that Roman Catholic parish corporations are not responsible for placing, training, 
hiring, retaining, supervising or terminating clergy or their faculties.7  This is solely the 
responsibility of the Archbishop or applicable religious order.  Id.   
Because parishes do not have the right or ability to control or dictate critical facets of the 
clergy’s work – including but not limited to, formation, admission, ordination, supervision, 
assignment, removal, faculties and duration of service – parishes will argue that they should not 
be held liable under any negligent employment theories recognized in Minnesota. 
In light of the tenuous and likely nominal negligence claims against the parishes and Tort 
Claimants’ and the UCC’s failed efforts pursuing substantive consolidation and avoidance 
claims, the only alternative basis to pursue parish liability is through a theory of imputation of 
Archdiocesan knowledge and liability to parish corporations.  By statute, the Archbishop and the 
7 Can. 241 §1, 242 §1, 259 (parishes have no authority for formation and admission); Can. 392; 
396 (parishes have no authority to approve and supervise); Can. 519, 523, 547, 274 §2, 523, 547, 
557 (parishes have no authority over clergy assignments); Can. 523, 524 (parishes have no right 
to remove clergy); Christus Dominus 19, Christus Dominus 28, Can. 273 (parishes cannot 
dictate/impair faculties). 
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Vicar General are members of each parish governance board.  Minn. Stat. § 315.15.  The general 
rule is that a director’s prior knowledge cannot be imputed to the corporation.  There is, 
however, one caveat to this rule:  A director’s knowledge may be imputed to the corporation in 
the narrow circumstance where that knowledge was acquired within the scope of the director’s 
activities on the board.  See, e.g., Weintraub v. Texasgulf, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1466, 1470 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (it is clear that a director’s knowledge may not properly be imputed to a 
corporation unless it is gained within the scope of his activity with respect to that corporation); 
Fidelity Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Avrutick, 740 F. Supp. 222, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); Etshokin 
v. Texasgulf, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (same).  Here, this lone caveat does 
not apply. 
To succeed on any imputation-of-knowledge theory, Tort Claimants must prove that the 
Archbishop’s or the Vicar General’s knowledge of a particular Tort Claim was acquired in 
connection with their service as directors or trustees of a parish.  Archdiocesan records and 
clergy files do not evidence any situation where such knowledge was obtained in the course of 
the Archbishop’s or the Vicar General’s service as a parish director or trustee and no such 
allegation has been made by the UCC.  And, as a practical matter, neither the Vicar General nor 
the Archbishop normally attends parish board meetings.  Parishes will vigorously pursue, and 
likely prevail on, this defense.   
On balance, the consideration being provided by the parishes in exchange for the 
channeling injunction is substantial, and even more so when considered relative to these non-
debtors’ nominal exposure and potential liability for Tort Claims. 
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3. FACTOR 3:  The channeling injunction is essential to a successful 
reorganization 
The third Master Mortgage factor considers whether the injunction is essential to 
reorganization, such that, without it, there would be little likelihood of success.  In re Master 
Mortg., 168 B.R. at 937-38.  Tellingly, the UCC makes no attempt to address this critical factor 
in its memorandum in support of its objection.  See UCC Memo at 1-11. 
Where other factors may be absent, courts have observed that this “Factor 3” becomes a 
critical consideration in assessing the practical realities and stakes in the event that the Plan 
incorporating the channeling injunction is not accepted by the impaired class.  For instance, in In 
re 710 Long Ridge Rd. Operating Co., II, LLC, No. 13-13653 (DHS), 2014 WL 886433 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2014), the court approved non-debtor injunctions in favor of owners and 
managers of the debtor even where affected classes voted against a plan that provided for the 
recovery of a small fraction of certain contingent and unliquidated claims.  Id. at *15-16.  
Relative to Factor 3, the court noted that the reorganization could not be achieved without the 
non-debtor releases.  Id.  Among other things, the released parties had agreed to waive, via the 
plan, $31 million in general unsecured claims against the debtor.  Id. at *5.  According to 
testimony offered in the case, and absent approval of the plan, the debtors (several nursing 
homes) would be forced to close their doors, liquidate, and provide minimal recovery to the 
various classes of creditors.  Balancing these considerations, the court found that the “proposed 
releases are necessary, essential, and fair under the circumstances.”  Id. at *16. 
Likewise, in In re U.S. Fidelis, the court found it persuasive that, absent the proposed 
non-debtor releases, the consideration to be paid to the creditors “evaporates” and the parties 
would likely spend “years litigating, resulting in a significant loss to the estate.  Meanwhile, the 
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consumer creditors most likely would end up with little return, and no return in the near future 
(further devaluing whatever return they may receive, if any).”  481 B.R. at 519. 
Here, the proposed channeling injunction is essential to the Archdiocese Plan for at least 
seven independent reasons.   
First, $156 million available under the Archdiocese Plan (including $13 million from 
parish carriers, $5-6 million in the GIF and more than $120 million of Archdiocese insurance 
settlements) will not be available absent the channeling injunction.  Settlement agreements with 
Archdiocese insurance carriers forming the foundation for the consideration to be paid into the 
Trust are expressly contingent upon the channeling injunction.  Indeed, as detailed in recently-
filed objections to the UCC’s plan, each of the settling insurers has represented that the necessary 
global insurance settlements cannot, and will not, be effectuated in the absence of a channeling 
injunction.  See ECF No.1121 (Certain Insurers Objection) at 14; ECF No. 1110 (Travelers 
Objection) at 17.  A channeling injunction is necessary and integral to any plan of reorganization 
in this case. 
Second, the Archdiocese’s future economic viability depends upon revenues from 
financially viable parishes.  As the foundation of giving for Catholics within the Archdiocese, it 
cannot be denied that parishes are uniquely situated to affect the Archdiocese’s financial 
condition.  For example, nearly 75% of the support for the Archdiocese’s missions comes from 
parish assessments.  Archdiocese Disclosure Statement at 14. 
Third, parish revenue streams and donations will no doubt decline if parishes face further 
financial exposure for Tort Claims.  Counsel for certain of the Tort Claimants have sued the 
majority of parishes in connection with the same sexual abuse accusations necessitating this 
bankruptcy case.  Regardless of the liability and damages determinations in these Parish 
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Lawsuits, parishes will incur, over the course of many years, substantial attorneys’ fees and costs 
to defend the suits, including likely coverage litigation.  These are monies that would otherwise 
help support the Archdiocese and its public service and social Catholic missions. 
Fourth, the channeling injunction is necessary to free the Archdiocese from indirect suits 
in the form of contribution claims.  Separate and apart from the inevitable, continued depletion 
of assets from the estate through Parish Lawsuits, the absence of a channeling injunction will 
expose the Archdiocese to financial strain by creating potential liability for contribution and 
indemnity claims by the parishes. 
Fifth, the channeling injunction is a necessary tool to halt the “death struggle” into which 
this case will devolve if a plan is not confirmed soon.  See In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 
780 F.3d at 1079–81.  Without the channeling injunction, litigation will continue for many years 
and drain substantial resources from the Archdiocese.  The Archdiocese cannot and will not 
liquidate.  And the absence of a channeling injunction will likely cause any plan of 
reorganization to fail, necessitating years of litigation that will result in the affected creditor 
classes receiving far less than they would recover under the Archdiocese Plan. 
Sixth, the Archbishop is charged with caring for and safeguarding the Catholic 
community, including the parishes.  The Archbishop cannot – from a practical, canonical, and 
moral position – abandon them.  See Canon 369.  Thus, parishes must be part of any plan of 
reorganization.  Put simply, the Archdiocese cannot receive a “fresh start” and the Catholic 
Church cannot function and maintain its core mission without viable parishes unburdened by 
litigation largely caused by decisions made at the diocesan level.   
Seventh, under RFRA, government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except … [g]overnment 
Case 15-30125    Doc 1131    Filed 08/04/17    Entered 08/04/17 15:02:38    Desc Main
 Document      Page 19 of 75
16 
may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application 
of the burden to the person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) 
is the least restrictive means of furthering that governmental interest.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (a)-
(b).  In 2000, Congress redefined “exercise of religion” under RFRA as “any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief”.  Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)).    
The Archdiocese broadly describes its religious mission on its website: ‘Making the name 
of Jesus Christ known and loved by promoting and proclaiming the Gospel in word and deed 
through vibrant parish communities, quality Catholic education, and ready outreach to the poor 
and marginalized.”  ECF No. 22 ¶17.  The parishes help carry out this mission by, among many 
other things, offering the liturgy, supporting liturgical and music ministries, offering sacramental 
preparation, offering faith formation for children and adults, offering vacation bible school, 
sponsoring mission trips, ministering to the sick, elderly, dying, and at-risk, and providing meals 
and fellowship after funerals.8  Many parishes also support  parish schools.  Such activities 
undoubtedly constitute the “exercise of religion” within the meaning of RFRA.  See, e.g., W. 
Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of D.C., 849 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D. D.C. 1994) 
(granting a preliminary injunction in favor of church because refusal to issue permit to allow 
church to feed the poor and homeless constituted “exercise of religion” under RFRA.)  The 
Archdiocese and the parishes, of course, are vehicles through which the Archbishop, other clergy 
members and parishioners exercise their religious beliefs by, among other things, providing them 
the opportunity to participate in and support such activities.  Cf. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 
8 See also Can. 1247 (“On Sundays and other holy days of obligation, the faithful are obliged to 
participate in the Mass.  Moreover, they are to abstain from those works and affairs which hinder 
the worship to be rendered to God, the joy proper to the Lord’s day, or the suitable relaxation of 
mind and body.”). 
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(“[P]rotecting the free-exercise rights of corporations . . . protects the religious liberty of the 
humans who own and control those companies.”).   
The simple truth is that many parishes’ fulfillment of their mission will be substantially 
burdened (and, some, irrevocably crippled) if left with the burden of defending hundreds of 
lawsuits, and, potentially, execution on their funds and properties.  See, e.g., Campos v. 
Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting a preliminary injunction where a 
prison regulation preventing the wearing of Santeria beads constituted a substantial burden under 
older version of RFRA).  Likewise, as discussed elsewhere, if parishes are left to defend these 
cases, the Archdiocese’s ability to reorganize and thereby pursue its mission will also be severely 
hampered. The result will be to substantially burden the exercise of religion not only by the 
Archdiocese and parishes, but  over 800,000 Catholics served by the Archdiocese and parishes.    
As noted, the Master Mortgage factors are neither exclusive nor conjunctive.  168 B.R. at 
935.  Given this and RFRA, it is appropriate to consider the effect on the Archdiocese, parishes 
and thousands of Catholics when assessing the applications of the channeling injunction factors. 
To disregard all of the Master Mortgage factors in favor of a single consent factor that serves no 
compelling governmental interest, but instead effectively gives veto power to the creditors 
represented by one attorney, would ignore RFRA and other laws protecting the free exercise of 
religion.9
9 For example, RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc, prohibits the government from implementing or 
imposing a land use regulation in a manner that substantially burdens religious exercise absent a 
compelling government interest and through the least restrictive means possible.  Likewise, the 
Minnesota Constitution places paramount importance on religious liberty.  See Edina Community 
Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (“The people of this state 
have always cherished religious liberty and the high importance of protecting this right is 
demonstrated by its treatment in our constitution, where it appears even before any reference to 
the formation of a government.”) (citing State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8-9 (Minn. 
1990)). 
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On balance, the $156 million in the Archdiocese’s Plan will not be available absent the 
channeling injunction and, regardless of the ultimate “validity” or merits of the parish 
contribution claims, the parishes’ continued exposure to sexual abuse claims post-confirmation 
would – given the unique canonical relationship between parishes and the Archdiocese – 
compromise any effective reorganization.  The future economic viability of the Archdiocese 
depends upon revenues from financially viable parishes.  If parishes are forced to defend, post-
confirmation, hundreds of sexual abuse claims, then the effectiveness of the Archdiocese’s 
discharge will be materially impaired:  The Archdiocese’s resources will still continue to be 
drained and depleted for years to come.  As applicable case law instructs, these are precisely the 
“unique” circumstances warranting third-party injunctions.  In re U.S. Fidelis, 481 B.R. at 520 
(Factor 3 satisfied where absent the releases, the parties would likely spend “years litigating, 
resulting in a significant loss to the estate”); In re 710 Long Ridge Rd., 2014 WL 886433, at *16 
(same). 
4. FACTOR 4:  A lack of consent from affected creditors does not defeat 
the channeling injunction 
The fourth Master Mortgage factor considers whether a substantial majority of the 
creditors, and especially the affected classes, agree to the release and have voted to accept the 
proposed plan treatment.  Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 938.  Relying on the minority view that 
a third-party release cannot be approved absent approval of the affected creditors (see In re 
Wash. Mut. Inc., 442 B.R. 314 (D. Del. 2011)), the UCC argues that the Archdiocese Plan should 
be rejected because “[n]o court has imposed third-party releases after affected creditors rejected 
the plan that contained them.”  UCC Memo at 5-6.  That is simply false. As detailed below, 
several courts have imposed third-party releases after affected creditors rejected the plan that 
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contained them.  Further, this Court cannot and should not allow these proceedings to be 
ultimately controlled and dictated by the demands of claimants’ counsel. 
In In re Sabine, for example, a non-consensual non-debtor third-party release was 
approved over the objection of both the creditors’ committee and holders of unsecured notes, 
even though the claims were extinguished rather than channeled to a trust.  555 B.R. at 291-94.  
The court was persuaded that the non-debtor’s contribution to the estate coupled with the reality 
that the proposed releases were “integral, important and necessary to the success of the Plan” 
militated in favor of the injunction. Id.   
Likewise, in In re 710 Long Ridge Rd., the bankruptcy court approved certain third-party 
releases even though an impaired non-consenting class rejected the plan and the court expressly 
found that “the Third-Party Releases have not met the fourth Master Mortgage Factor.”  2014 
WL 886433, at *15.  Even though this “impacted class” voted against the plan, the court was 
satisfied that Master Mortgage factors two and three were satisfied:  “the proposed releases 
[were] necessary, essential, and fair under the circumstances.”  Id. at 16. 
And in In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd. et al., 513 B.R. 233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2014), the court approved nonconsensual third-party releases for claims that would, like the 
instant case, trigger indemnification or contribution claims against the debtors.  The court 
explained: 
[T]he Court will permit Third Party Releases for claims that would trigger 
indemnification or contribution claims against the Debtor and thus impact the 
Debtors’ reorganization.  As Judge Gerber of this Court has cogently explained, 
‘Some people and entities (e.g., by employment contracts, corporate bylaws, or 
retention or loan agreements) must be indemnified by the estate with respect to 
their services.  To the extent that the third party releases are congruent with the 
indemnification obligations, and the Debtors would be liable for any liability 
imposed on such persons, third-party releases are acceptable.  That is so even if 
they involve professionals for, or lenders to, the estate.’  In re Adelphia 
Commc’ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 268 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Thus, the Court 
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will approve third party releases to align with indemnification obligations of the 
Debtors that existed before the filing of these bankruptcy cases by virtue of 
employment agreements, bylaws, retentions, or other loan agreements. 
Id. at 271.   
The court reached a similar conclusion in In re Gawker Media, LLC.  See Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order at 10-11, In re Gawker Media, LLC, No. 16-11700 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 638 (approving non-consensual third-party releases where there was at least 
one class that was deemed to reject the plan and did not get to vote but was nevertheless subject 
to the third-party injunction and release).  In In re Gawker Media, the court found that the claims 
“covered by the third-party releases are based on conduct for which a Debtor might be liable for 
Debtor Indemnification Obligations” since the released parties “have filed Claims against the 
Debtors for Debtor Indemnification Obligations for potential and threatened litigation.”  Id.  The 
court found that these releases were “necessary based on the unique circumstances here,” 
explaining that: 
[The non-debtor released parties] have voted in favor of the Plan and are waiving 
and releasing all claims against the Debtors for Debtor Indemnification 
Obligations, unless otherwise agreed to by the Debtors or their insurance carriers.  
Each holder of a Claim or Equity Interest that has received or is deemed to have 
received distributions made under the Plan in turn benefits from an immediate 
distribution.  Absent the Third-Party Releases in favor of the [non-debtor released 
parties], the Debtors might have been required to set aside additional reserves in 
respect of Debtor Indemnification Obligations, the Plan Settlements may not have 
been agreed to, and are therefore important to the Plan.  Furthermore, the Debtors 
would be subject to substantial Claims for Debtor Indemnification Obligations in 
respect of claims or causes of action brought against the [non-debtor released  
parties]. 
Id.   
The same result is appropriate here.  While a majority of the affected creditors may have 
voted against the Archdiocese Plan, this lone factor should not be permitted to subsume the 
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balance of the Master Mortgage analysis, especially where, as is the case here, the proposed 
channeling injunction is necessary, essential and fair under the circumstances.    
Additionally, the UCC’s reliance on this factor is particularly unavailing in the instant 
case where the record reveals that counsel representing a majority of the Tort Claimants likely 
secured the subject votes through the broad dissemination of inflammatory and materially false 
and misleading information, as is evidenced by: (1) the stark voting discrepancies between Tort 
Claimants represented by Jeff Anderson & Associates (“Anderson Claimants”), on the one hand, 
and pro se Tort Claimants and Tort Claimants represented by counsel with the second largest 
number of Tort Claims (the “Non-Anderson Claimant Group”), on the other hand; as well as (2) 
the UCC’s facially and demonstrably false statements published in press releases and news 
articles.  
With respect to voting discrepancies, 97% of the Anderson Claimants who returned 
ballots  (362 of 373 claimants) voted to reject the Archdiocese Plan.  In sharp contrast, a majority 
of the Non-Anderson Claimant Group (61.54%, i.e., 8 of 13 claimants) voted in favor of the 
Archdiocese Plan.  Likewise, a majority of the pro se claimants (57.69%, i.e., 15 of 26 
claimants) voted either in favor of the Archdiocese Plan or expressed no preference.  Given the 
false and misleading information disseminated by the UCC and Jeff Anderson & Associates 
(“JAA”) concerning the Archdiocese Plan, it is not a coincidence that the Anderson Claimants 
ultimately voted very differently from their Class 6 peers.10  Among other things: 
• Counsel for Tort Claimants and the UCC have continually represented to the Court 
and the public that the Archdiocese is “hiding” over $1 billion of assets. The UCC 
attempted to retract its most recent false statement on June 14, 2017, effectively 
attesting to its falsity.  See ECF Nos. 1074, 1086, 1088, 1092. 
10 And, of course, absent this false and misleading information, the percentage of pro se
claimants and the Non-Anderson Claimant Group voting in favor of the Archdiocese Plan would 
have likely been even higher.   
Case 15-30125    Doc 1131    Filed 08/04/17    Entered 08/04/17 15:02:38    Desc Main
 Document      Page 25 of 75
22 
• Counsel for the Anderson Claimants has issued a deluge of press releases and held 
multiple press conferences where, among other demonstrably false representations, it 
has accused the Archdiocese of: (i) “multiple, deceptive actions taken … to divert and 
shelter funds from sexual abuse survivors”; (ii) “contributing less than 1% of its 
assets” under its Plan; (iii) “hid[ing] assets that could and should be available to 
survivors the same way they did sexual offenders and their misconduct for years”; 
(iv) letting the “insurance companies off-the-hook” for “deceptive practices” and 
stating that “these insurance contracts require them to pay close to $1 billion”; and (v) 
proposing, under its Plan, that it only “contribute $20 million of its own funds, that all 
insurance issues are settled for unreasonable amounts, and that all parishes will be 
released from the case without contributing a penny”.    
• During a June 2, 2016 hearing, the Court admonished JAA for promoting this false 
narrative to the public and media and directed that these activities cease: 
…When I read in the [newspaper] that the Archdiocese is hiding assets 
or that it’s misleading the court, that is not at all helpful to proceeding 
forward on this, and not true.  The motion that the Committee made 
nowhere mentioned anything about hiding assets or misleading the 
court.  These are assets.  Of course, the whole premise [of the] motion 
made by the Committee is that these aren’t the Archdiocese’s assets, that 
they’re someone else’s and you want them consolidated, but making 
accusations like that in public, which are not supported by the motion, 
are not helpful to proceeding forward in this, and I hope that that stops 
as well…. 
ECF No. 1086, Ex. B (partial transcript of hearing). 
• Notwithstanding the Court’s admonition and directive, the false narrative continued.  
By way of example, the UCC recently represented in a May 11, 2017 press release 
that the Archdiocese Plan called for the Archdiocese to contribute less than 1 percent 
of its assets (over $1 billion).  See Stinson Leonard Street, Archdiocese’s Bankruptcy 
Plan Voted Down by Clergy Abuse Survivors, News Release (May 11, 2017). 
• Relying on these falsehoods, the Star Tribune published an article dated June 15, 
2017, stating that “the victims’ plan would tap what attorneys say is $1 billion in 
Archdiocese property and assets not accounted for in the Archdiocese settlement 
plan.” Jean Hopfensperger, Objections to Twin Cities Archdiocese Bankruptcy Plans 
Aired in Court, Star Trib. June 15, 2017, http://www.startribune.com/objections-to-
twin-cities-archdiocese-bankruptcy-plans-aired-in-court/428709053/. 
• The UCC also falsely claimed that the Archdiocese pled guilty to criminal activity 
and then later the UCC attempted to retract its false statement on June 14, 2017, 
thereby attesting to its falsity. See ECF Nos. 1074, 1086, 1088, 1092. 
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If the UCC and JAA made the effort to communicate these false statements to the press 
and the public, then they undoubtedly made these same representations to their constituents and 
clients.  The non-viability of a plan that purports to “hide” over $1 billion of Archdiocesan assets 
is self-evident and these materially false statements undoubtedly contributed to, and provided a 
basis for, the Anderson Claimants’ overwhelming rejection of the Archdiocese Plan.  As noted in 
another objection, the UCC plan is also replete with other inaccuracies that likely affected the 
solicitation.  The UCC improperly continues to push these false narratives in its objection to the 
Archdiocese Plan. 
In the end, the importance and necessity of the channeling injunction to the 
reorganization (per Factors 2 and 3 above) is sufficient to satisfy Master Mortgage regardless of 
the voting results.  But to the extent the Court is otherwise inclined to consider the voting results, 
the UCC should not be permitted to rely on this factor alone to support its objection to the 
Archdiocese Plan where it disseminated materially false and misleading information in an 
apparent effort to stonewall the Archdiocese’s reasonable efforts to obtain consent from the 
affected creditors. See, e.g., In re Walnut Equip. Leasing Co., Inc., No. 97-19699DWS, 1999 WL 
1068448, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1999) (holding that an attorneys’ dissemination of a 
letter to creditors with misleading information “sufficiently tainted the vote in Class 5 to justify 
ignoring that Class’ acceptance of the Plan for the purpose of §1129(b)”); In re Gulph Woods 
Corp., 83 B.R. 339, 342-43 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (reasoning that vote solicitation which 
contained falsehoods or mischaracterizations would violate § 1125(b) because it would tend to 
unfairly influence voting on the plan). 
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5. FACTOR 5:  The Archdiocese Plan provides a mechanism to pay all 
or substantially all of the classes affected by the channeling injunction 
The fifth Master Mortgage factor considers whether the Plan provides a mechanism for 
the payment of all, or substantially all, of the claims of the class or classes affected by the 
injunction.  In re Master Mortg., 168 B.R. at 938.  The UCC argues that the Archdiocese cannot 
satisfy this factor because the Tort Claimants have demanded, on the face of their Tort Proofs of 
Claim, an amount that exceeds $1.5 billion.  UCC Memo at 6-7.  This argument fails for at least 
five independent reasons.  
First, the UCC should not be permitted to rely on a willful violation of this Court’s 
directive and now assert that the Tort Proofs of Claims constitute prima facie evidence of the 
amount of the Tort Claims.  During an April 17, 2015 hearing, the Court expressly advised the 
parties that the Tort Proofs of Claims should not include the amount of the Tort Claimants’ 
alleged damages:   
THE COURT:  I thought it was kind of irrelevant because the proof of claim form 
doesn’t ask for an amount, does it, as I recall? 
MR. BORGER: I believe the single page form does. The longer form I don’t think 
there’s anything on there, but there is a single page form that – 
THE COURT: Well, the official form like anyone else, of course, is in some ways 
anomalous not to require a claimed amount, but I think it’s intentional, so if I 
overlooked it -- I didn’t overlook it. I thought about it and rejected it. I guess I 
didn’t say it exclusively.  I saw no reason to do it because there aren’t going to be 
any numbers on the claim forms for sexual abuse victims. If they are, frankly 
they are going to be meaningless, right. 
I mean these people rightly feel hugely damaged and they are going to put huge 
numbers in their claim forms, in their -- uninformed and not maybe -- what I said 
is what I meant, which is a goal I always strive for. 
ECF No. 206 (Hr’g Transcript, April 16, 2015) at 80:9-81:8.   
Contrary to the claim form approved by the Court, and notwithstanding the Court’s 
expressed desire that Tort Claims not include the amount of alleged damages, many Tort 
Case 15-30125    Doc 1131    Filed 08/04/17    Entered 08/04/17 15:02:38    Desc Main
 Document      Page 28 of 75
25 
Claimants, all represented by JAA, amended their Tort Proof of Claim forms to include the 
amount of their alleged damages.  As the Court anticipated, the amounts alleged are “huge,” in 
excess of $1.6 billion. 
Second, the evidentiary presumption that the UCC relies upon to advance its position 
does not apply to this proceeding.  Specifically, the Archdiocese is not seeking to allow, 
disallow, or liquidate Tort Claims in moving for approval of the settlements or seeking plan 
confirmation.  Nor is it seeking to preclude any party from introducing admissible evidence for 
the Court to consider and weigh.  Instead, the Archdiocese, as previously noted in filings with 
the court, will seek an order barring application of an evidentiary presumption that the Tort 
Claims are valid and worth over $1.6 billion.11  The evidentiary presumption under Rule 3001(f) 
only applies for the purposes of distributing the estate’s assets.  See In re SRC Holding Corp., 
No. 02-40284, 2007 WL 1464385, at *1-2 (D. Minn. May 15, 2007) (collecting cases and stating 
that “the collateral or preclusive effect of a filed proof of claim is limited to the bankruptcy 
court’s distribution”); see also In re Beckham, No. 03-10499, 2004 WL 2201264, at *1 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2004) (“A proof of claim establishes prima facie evidence of a valid debt for 
purposes of distribution from estate assets.”).  Thus, the evidentiary presumption for non-
objected-to proofs of claims under Rule 3001(f) simply does not apply in the context of the 
proceedings anticipated in this case.  
11 Specifically, in its May 4, 2017 motion for entry of an order setting status and scheduling 
conference, the Archdiocese advised the Court and the parties that it disputes that the proofs of 
claim constitute prima facie evidence of the value of the claims in the absence of an objection 
and believes that this Court should enter an order ensuring that the amounts asserted by counsel 
in the proofs of claim have no evidentiary value by themselves and the unproven facts set forth 
therein are not prima facie evidence of the factual basis for the claim.  ECF No. 1039 at 6.  In the 
absence of appropriate relief, the Archdiocese may have no choice but to file multiple objections 
to Class 6 Tort Claims.  The Archdiocese has attempted from the beginning of this case to avoid 
the need to take this divisive, expensive and time-consuming step. 
Case 15-30125    Doc 1131    Filed 08/04/17    Entered 08/04/17 15:02:38    Desc Main
 Document      Page 29 of 75
26 
Third, in assessing the value of claims under a Master Mortgage analysis, courts may 
look beyond the face value of the claim.  In In re 710 Long Ridge Rd., for example, the court 
determined that Factor 5 was satisfied where, over the objection of the affected creditors, the 
“Plan provides for payments to all classes of claims in excess of the liquidation value of those 
claims” as opposed to their face value.  2014 WL 886433, at *16 (emphasis added).   
Fourth, the UCC’s position also ignores the reality that, unlike the cases upon which it 
relies, the Archdiocese Plan is not a blanket release of any claims against the Protected Parties.  
Rather, the Plan channels a specific and limited group of claims to a dedicated fund to pay Tort 
Claims of those affected by the injunction.  The Archdiocese Plan provides for efficient payment 
of claims without years of extensive litigation, and preserves claimants’ rights to participate in a 
recovery.  This important fact has been a core consideration by courts in assessing whether a 
plan provides a mechanism for substantial payment.  Nat’l Heritage Found. Inc. v. Highbourne 
Found., 760 F. 3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2014); Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found., No. 1:12-cv-
1329, 2013 WL 1390822, at *8 (“this [Factor 5] consideration has typically been used to justify 
release provisions where the reorganization plan includes a mechanism such as a dedicated 
settlement fund to pay the claims”); see also In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 
136, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Courts have approved nondebtor releases when . . . the enjoined claims 
were ‘channeled’ to a settlement fund rather than extinguished”).  As noted above, the parishes 
will contribute significant consideration to the Trust. 
Fifth, the Archdiocese will establish that the fund of $156 million provided in the 
Archdiocese Plan, including the largest insurance settlement of any reported diocesan bankruptcy 
case, represents an amount that meets the reasonable value of the Tort Claims given the many 
dispositive liability and cognizability issues summarized below.  The Archdiocese will further 
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show that the average payout per Tort Claimant under the Archdiocese Plan is over $350,000 
(even assuming that every Tort Claim is cognizable) and that this number represents a per-claim 
average that is larger than those achieved in a majority of other reported bankruptcy cases.12
And to the extent those claimants with facially invalid Tort Claims are disregarded in the 
analysis, then this per-claim average will increase significantly.  Additionally, under the Trust 
Distribution Plan, more serious claims will receive a significantly higher amount than the 
average payout per Tort Claimant.  
The Archdiocese recognizes the circumstances giving rise to this case, and for this reason 
it did all it could to maximize the value of its estate and provide certainty for the immediate 
benefit of claimants.  Under the Archdiocese plan, all living claimants are eligible for 
compensation that will be determined by parties other than the Archdiocese.  Throughout these 
proceedings, the Archdiocese has attempted to avoid contentious litigation regarding the viability 
of sexual abuse claims so that the healing process can be accelerated. 
However, legal defenses to liability must be considered in determining whether claimants 
are “substantially” compensated on their claims.  Since the inception of this bankruptcy case, the 
Archdiocese has dedicated substantial time and resources to reviewing, investigating and 
assessing the legal merits of all Tort Claims.  Based on this work, which continues today, the 
Archdiocese can demonstrate that the majority of Tort Claims filed in this bankruptcy case 
would likely be subject to dismissal on one or more of the six grounds identified below.  In 
accordance with this Court’s order on the procedures for reviewing and submitting proofs of 
claim [ECF No. 188], and in an effort to protect the confidentiality of Tort Claimants, the 
Archdiocese has attempted only to briefly summarize these bases for dismissal along with the 
12 Of course, net returns will vary depending on allowed administrative costs and the allowed 
fees of claimants’ counsel which vary from 0% for one claimant to 40% for others. 
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total, aggregate number of claims falling within each defense category.  At the Court’s direction, 
the Archdiocese is prepared to provide additional facts, detail and argument to support the 
following defenses and grounds for disallowance of certain claims. 
• Tort Claims that are not cognizable as a matter of law.  At least 165 Tort Claims are 
potentially subject to dismissal because they fall within one or more of the following 
twelve categories:  (1) the claim is time barred under the applicable statute of 
limitations because the claimant was an adult at the time of the alleged abuse and thus 
not revived pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 541.073 (2013); (2) the claim was previously 
adjudicated to conclusion in a prior court action; (3) the claim was previously settled 
with the Archdiocese or under express terms that extend the release to the Archdiocese; 
(4) the alleged abuse was committed by an unknown individual or a non-Archdiocesan 
clergy member outside of the Archdiocese; (5) the claim includes no allegation of 
sexual touch or misconduct; (6) the alleged abuse was committed by a non-clergy 
member solely through his/her employment at a State or Religious Order-run facility, 
school or retreat; (7) the alleged abuse did not occur in connection with any faculties 
conferred upon the accused or through any priestly function (e.g., the accused did not 
represent himself as a priest or did not come into contact with the Claimant through any 
assignment in the Archdiocese); (8) the claim, on its face, demonstrates that it is not 
viable or solely implicates alleged misconduct by persons who are not agents of the 
Church; (9) the claim asserts abuse by a lay teacher, administrator or employee of a 
non-debtor entity for whom the Archdiocese neither employed nor supervised; (10) the 
claim asserts abuse by a religious order brother or sister assigned to a non-debtor entity; 
(11) the claimant is a deceased individual or the claim has been withdrawn; and (12) 
the claim cannot be supported or corroborated by any available information. 
• Sexual abuse claims that are untimely.  41 Tort Claims were filed after the August 3, 
2015 claim filing deadline.  Under applicable bankruptcy rules, these claims will be 
disallowed unless and until the subject Tort Claimants satisfy their burden of 
demonstrating, through motion practice, that their failure to timely file the claim “was 
the result of excusable neglect.”  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1).  While this standard is 
an “elastic concept,” the Supreme Court has observed that “inadvertence, ignorance of 
the rules, or mistakes construing the rules” will not generally constitute “excusable” 
neglect.  Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 392 
(1993).  Those unable to meet this burden will be barred from recovering any amount 
on their claims. See, e.g., Gretchen’s of Minneapolis v. Highland House, Inc. (In re 
Interco, Inc.), 186 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding no excusable neglect where 
the notice was not “obscure” and the claimant had four weeks’ notice of the date on 
which the claim would be barred).  
• Sexual abuse claimants who lack standing to assert their claims.  In addition to the 
foregoing, and separate and apart from the other legal  issues detailed below, 136 of the 
Class 6 claims were filed by Tort Claimants sought bankruptcy protection on one or 
more occasions and, in doing so, failed to identify their then existing Tort Claims.  
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Debtors  who fail to disclose their Tort Claims in prior or pending bankruptcies may 
not have standing to pursue these nondisclosed claims following the conclusion of the 
bankruptcy case. Under certain circumstances, this conclusion may be applicable even 
if his or her Tort Claim was time barred as of the time of his or her bankruptcy filing. 
See Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[A] 
statute of limitations does not eliminate the debt; it merely limits the judicial remedies 
available.”).  Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the automatic 
abandonment to the debtor of “property scheduled” at the closing of the case. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 554(c). Because the claims asserted in this case were not disclosed on the schedules 
in the prior cases, they may remain the property of the bankruptcy estate (subject to any 
valid claim of exemption asserted in the reopened case).   To the knowledge of counsel, 
none of the relevant prior bankruptcy cases have been reopened to administer the 
claims that were not originally scheduled.  The Archdiocese fully appreciates the 
sensitive and confidential nature of the claims in this case. The fact remains, however, 
that a  number of  the 136 claims at issue in this paragraph may be subject to 
disallowance for lack of standing.13
• Sexual abuse claims involving situations where the Archdiocese had no prior 
knowledge.  Minnesota courts have held that three causes of action are available to a 
claimant who sues an employer for injuries caused by an employee:  negligent hiring, 
negligent retention and negligent supervision.  M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 
856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1955).  Since the inception of this bankruptcy case, all parties have 
acknowledged that the first two theories (negligent hiring and negligent retention) 
require a showing that the Archdiocese had specific, prior knowledge of the specific 
perpetrator’s dangerous propensities.  With respect to at least 415 of the Tort Claims 
asserted in this bankruptcy case, there is no evidence to indicate or suggest that the 
Archdiocese was on notice of any alleged dangerous propensity on the part of the 
accused individual(s).  In each of these cases, the Archdiocese did not receive a report 
of alleged sexual misconduct by the accused individual (if at all) until after the alleged 
incident(s) of abuse occurred.  Regardless of whether negligent supervision claims 
impose direct or vicarious liability (or something in between), claimants’ “well-known 
hazard” theory of negligent supervision – which attempts to ignore actor-specific 
conduct – faces dismissal as a matter of law if asserted in the context of the existing 
bankruptcy case.  Minnesota federal courts that have considered this issue routinely and 
uniformly require actor-specific knowledge to prove foreseeability in negligent 
supervision cases decided under Minnesota law.  See Damgaard v. Avera Health, No. 
CIV. 13-2192 RHK/JSM, 2015 WL 3561336, at *4 (D. Minn. June 3, 2015); Halsne v. 
Avera Health, No. 12-CV-2409 SRN/JJG, 2014 WL 1153504, at *7 (D. Minn. Mar. 21, 
2014); Phillips v. Speedway SuperAmerica LLC, No. CIV 09-2447 RHK/FLN, 2010 
WL 4323069, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 22, 2010); Hudson v. City of Minneapolis, No. 
CIV.04-3313(JNE/FLN), 2006 WL 752935, at *7 (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 2006); Jones v. 
James, No. CIV.02-4131 JNE/RLE, 2005 WL 459652, at *7 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2005); 
Lumsden v. Reichert, No. CIV.00-2463(JEL/JGL), 2003 WL 1610782, at *8 (D. Minn. 
13 129 of the 136 claims subject to this defense are also subject to one or more other defenses. 
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Mar. 11, 2003).  Because most Tort Claimants cannot make this showing, their claims 
are likely subject to dismissal.   
• Sexual abuse claims with causation or credibility issues.  In addition to the claims 
identified above as potentially not cognizable, at least 59 Tort Claims have causation or 
credibility issues that must be considered in assessing the value of these claims.  They 
fall into one or more of the following six categories: (1) the alleged abuse was 
committed by a family member or close family friend/guest or occurred under 
circumstances where the Archdiocese did not have the authority, right or opportunity to 
exercise control over the accused; (2) the accusation may have been settled or 
previously adjudicated/resolved but further facts and evaluation are required; (3) the 
claim as alleged does not appear to constitute sexual abuse/touch and thus does not 
implicate a cause of action revived by the Minnesota Child Victims Act; (4) the claim 
contains the only accusation of sexual misconduct of a minor against the clergy 
member and there are no facts or documents that corroborate or lend support to the 
allegation; (5) the accusation provides insufficient information to assess the credibility 
of the claim; and (6) the facts alleged are inconsistent with known dates, prior accounts, 
assignment histories, patterns of conduct, and other verifiable data. 
• Sexual abuse claims implicating religious orders or non-debtor entities.  Finally, at least 
128 Tort Claims implicate religious orders that are primarily, if not solely, liable for the 
alleged abuse.  Fault allocations to the Archdiocese in these cases will be either 
eliminated or diminished.  Additionally, several Tort Claims implicate other non-debtor 
entities that are primarily, if not solely responsible for the alleged abuse.  They include 
independent schools, other dioceses and wholly-unrelated and secular entities. 
On balance, the Archdiocese’s proposed fund of $156 million, coupled with the numerous 
meritorious defenses to liability on the applicable Tort Claims, provides more than a sufficient 
foundation for the Court to conclude that the Archdiocese Plan provides for payment of 
substantially all of the relevant claims. 
6. FAIRNESS AND PUBLIC INTEREST:  The channeling injunction 
promotes fairness and serves the public interest 
In addition to application of the five Master Mortgage factors, one notable bankruptcy 
decision from within the Eighth Circuit has analyzed and applied two additional relevant 
considerations:  (i) “fairness in general” and (ii) “public interest.” In re U.S. Fidelis, 481 B.R. at 
520-21.  Although ignored by the UCC, these additional factors also weigh strongly in favor of a 
channeling injunction for several reasons.  
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As an initial matter, in the absence of a channeling injunction, the Tort Claimants will not 
be treated equally.  Unequal treatment is inconsistent with principle of 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) to 
“provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class” unless such 
unequally-treated claimant agrees to unequal treatment.14  Outside of a bankruptcy plan, it is 
likely that claimants would encounter a vast divergence of recovery that would result from 
collectability, insurance coverage disputes, and timing of litigation.  Moreover, litigating all Tort 
Claims will be time-consuming.  This would be particularly harmful to older claimants who may 
receive nothing if they pass away before final a determination.  See argument at p.69 infra.  A 
distribution under the Trust, by contrast, will result in much earlier payment. 
In addition to ensuring that Tort Claimants are treated fairly, a channeling injunction will 
serve the public interest.  As noted in Section I(C)(3) above, a channeling injunction is necessary 
here to preserve the missions of the Church, which include outreach to the poor and 
marginalized.  Excluding the State, the Archdiocese is the largest provider of social services in 
Minnesota.  Hundreds of thousands of Minnesotans, including the poor and the marginalized, 
depend upon the viability of the Archdiocese and its parishes.  See ECF No. 22 at 5-7.  In the 
absence of a channeling injunction, any plan of reorganization cannot succeed and years of 
protracted litigation will follow.  Many parishes may be forced into bankruptcy. This will not 
only harm Tort Claimants (resulting in less recovery than what is provided in the Archdiocese 
Plan), but it will further deplete the assets and strain the resources of the Archdiocese.  These 
protracted proceedings and the attendant cost will only continue to impair the Archdiocese’s 
ability to serve the community that depends upon its financial viability. 
14 Similarly, the “cram down” statute, 11 U.S.C. § 1129, requires that the plan not discriminate 
unfairly and that it is fair and equitable with respect to each class.   
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Accordingly, the unique circumstances of this case will result in harm to the public 
interest and the unfair and disparate treatment of affected Tort Claimants in the absence of a 
channeling injunction.
II. UCC OBJECTION NO. 2 FAILS:  THE ARCHDIOCESE PLAN DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A FINAL ORDER ON ABUSE CLAIMS AGAINST NON-
DEBTORS 
A. The Archdiocese Plan preserves Tort Claimants’ right to litigate 
The UCC’s second objection, which challenges this Court’s jurisdiction to issue a 
channeling injunction, is dead on arrival because it relies entirely upon the false premise that 
confirmation of “the Debtor’s Plan would constitute a final disposition of the survivors’ claims 
against non-debtors.”  UCC Memo at 11.  That is simply not the case.  As this Court previously 
noted: “I am not going to determine anything other than confirming the plan or not confirming 
the plan, so I am not determining – I am not determining any claims.”  ECF No. 1095 (Hr’g 
Transcript, June 15, 2017) at 34:3-7. 
This Court’s June 15, 2017 statements are absolutely correct.  The Archdiocese Plan does 
not release or extinguish any Tort Claims against any non-debtor.  Rather Tort Claims against a 
limited group of non-debtors, the Protected Parties, are “channeled” to the Trust, to be 
prosecuted against the Trust instead of the Protected Parties.  Archdiocese Plan §§ 4.6(b), 
5.2(c)(2).  The Tort Claimants’ right to a jury trial in the district court is fully preserved and Tort 
Claimants may pursue their Tort Claims against the Protected Parties in district court, should 
they wish.  Id. 15  Confirmation of the Archdiocese Plan does not constitute a final order on any 
Tort Claims against non-debtors. 
15 A potential limitation (see Archdiocese Plan § 5.2(f)(2)) on the amount a Litigation Claimant 
can recover passes constitutional muster and does not offend notions of due process where all 
rights to a jury trial are preserved.  See in re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 169-70 and n. 146  
(D. Del. 2012) (quoting Pierre v. E. Air Lines Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486, 488 (D.N.J.1957) (“The 
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B. Stern and its progeny are inapposite 
The UCC contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 
(2011), and Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), somehow limit this court’s 
jurisdiction to approve a channeling injunction.  UCC Memo at 11-12.  But, consistent with the 
fatal flaw addressed in Section II(A) above, those cases addressed a bankruptcy court’s 
constitutional authority to enter a final order adjudicating a state law claim.  Again, with respect 
to the Archdiocese Plan, in contrast, the Bankruptcy Court is not adjudicating any claims.  
Rather, it is exercising its undisputed constitutional authority to confirm a plan.  Stern and its 
progeny, as interpreted by the UCC, simply do not apply. 
The UCC’s reliance on In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, No. BR 15-12284-LSS, 
2017 WL 1032992 (D. Del. Mar. 17, 2017) is equally unavailing.  Unlike the Archdiocese Plan, 
the Millennium Labs plan provided non-debtors with full releases and discharges, and thereby, 
according to the court, completely extinguished, among other things, common law fraud and 
RICO claims held by the appellants.  The Millennium Labs court concluded that the complete 
extinguishment of these claims, with no opportunity for litigation, potentially implicated Stern’s 
constitutional concern.  Id. at *12-13.   
Because the channeled claims are neither adjudicated, nor extinguished, via the 
Archdiocese Plan, the cases upon which the UCC relies are inapposite.   
Seventh Amendment only requires that a jury make the factual findings regarding a plaintiff’s 
particular grievance”; thus, “‘there is no violation of the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial in 
the limitation of the amount of damages.’”).  In fact, the UCC’s Plan also limits the amount some 
claimants can personally recover after a jury trial.  ECF No. 890 § 6.2(i). 
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C. Even if the Archdiocese Plan did not preserve Tort Claimants’ right to 
litigate (which it does), this Court possesses constitutional authority to 
resolve claims that are “integral” to a Debtor’s restructuring   
Even if Stern were relevant, it should be construed narrowly.  The Stern court itself stated 
that the question presented there, relating to core jurisdiction to enter final orders on certain state 
law counterclaims, was “a ‘narrow’ one.”  Stern, 564 U.S. at 502 (internal citations omitted).   
For more than a quarter century, the Supreme Court has consistently held that bankruptcy 
courts have constitutional authority to resolve matters that are integral to the bankruptcy 
proceeding itself.  See, e.g., Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990); N. Pipeline Constr. 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982).  The UCC seeks to upend this well-
established principle based on a contrived reading of Stern.  Specifically, the UCC contends that, 
under Stern, a determination of “state law claims of abuse survivors against non-debtor parties” 
would exceed the bankruptcy court’s jurisdictional reach.  This artificially constrained 
interpretation of Stern has no basis in principle or precedent.  UCC Memo at 11-12. 
Stern, instead, merely reaffirmed the foundational principle of bankruptcy law that 
bankruptcy courts have constitutional authority to resolve matters that are “integral to the 
restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship.”  Stern, 564 U.S. at 497 (emphasis added, 
quoting Langenkamp, 498 U.S. at 44).  This authority does not turn on the nature of a claim in 
the abstract be it common law, statutory or otherwise.  Rather, the crucial inquiry is the claim’s 
relationship to core Article I bankruptcy processes such as confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.   
In accordance with Stern, courts have continued to exercise jurisdiction over plans 
containing releases of third-party state law claims, where such releases are “integrally related” to 
the reorganization.  In In re Charles Street African Methodist Episcopal Church of Boston, 499 
B.R. 66 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013), for instance, the court confirmed a plan containing a third-party 
release.  The court noted that confirmation of a plan “[i]s not the mere adjudication of a single 
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claim by a creditor against a third-party guarantor but a unitary omnibus civil proceeding for the 
reorganization or adjustment of all obligations of the debtor and disposition of all the debtor’s 
assets.”  Id. at 99. The Charles Street court held that, unlike the purely private dispute 
represented by the tortious interference claim in Stern, “the confirmation of a plan – including 
any third-party release it may propose – is a matter of ‘public rights’ that, under Stern, Congress 
may constitutionally assign to a non-Article III adjudicator.”  Id.  The Charles Street court 
concluded that it “undoubtedly has jurisdiction to adjudicate the plan, even without recourse to 
its related-to jurisdiction.”  Id.
Numerous other courts throughout the country have reached the same conclusion.  See, 
e.g., In re MPM Silicones LLC, No. 14-22503-RDD, 2014 WL 4436335, at *2, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (confirming, post-Stern, a chapter 11 plan 
which included a non-consensual third-party release, noting that “[t]he issues all involve 
fundamental aspects of the adjustment of the debtor/creditor relationship, and “clearly pertain to 
rights unique to bankruptcy law,” and concluding that it “can issue a final order on [the third 
party release] within the confines of Stern v. Marshall, given that this is in the context of the 
confirmation of the plan, and pertains ultimately to the debtors’ rights under the Bankruptcy 
Code.”);  In re Linear Elect. Co., 852 F.3d 313, 320 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that bankruptcy 
courts have authority to resolve claims regarding state law construction liens where necessary to 
“determine whether the liens violated the automatic stay.”); In re Christ Hosp., No. CIV.A. 14-
472 ES, 2014 WL 4613316, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014) (affirming the authority of a 
bankruptcy court to enter a sale order outside the claims allowance process permanently 
enjoining state law claims between non-debtors “based upon bankruptcy sale/marketplace 
necessities”).   
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In other words, even if confirmation of the Archdiocese Plan adjudicated the third-party 
claims (which it does not), the Bankruptcy Court would have the constitutional authority to do 
so.  Moreover, interpreting Millennium Labs as precluding the inclusion of a channeling 
injunction in a plan would upend decades of case law, including the seminal Master Mortgage
case and the substantial body of case law discussed in Section I above.
Here, as detailed in Section I(C)(3) above, the channeling of the claimants’ state law tort 
claims against the parishes is necessary and integral to a viable reorganization; without it, a 
confirmable plan will not be possible.  The $156 million in the Archdiocese Plan will not be 
available and the Archdiocese’s assets, as well as the assets of the parishes upon which its 
economic viability depends, will continue to be depleted and mired by the very same Tort Claims 
that gave rise to this bankruptcy case.   
Moreover, in addition to the channeling injunction being integral to the restructuring 
process, the channeled claims themselves are squarely before the bankruptcy court in the form of 
the Tort Proofs of Claim and the parishes’ contribution claims.  Importantly, the Stern court did 
not disturb earlier Supreme Court decisions affirming bankruptcy court constitutional authority 
to resolve claims that are intertwined with the claims resolution process.  In Katchen v. Landy, 
382 U.S. 323 (1966), and Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990) (per curiam), the Supreme 
Court upheld the bankruptcy courts’ authority to decide claims which the claimants contended 
should be resolved by Article III tribunals.  Unlike the tortious interference claim in Stern, which 
was entirely independent of the defamation proof of claim to which it was a counterclaim, the 
claims in Katchen and Langenkamp were intertwined with the claimants’ proofs of claim filed in 
the bankruptcy proceeding.  As the Katchen court noted, once the claim in bankruptcy was 
addressed, “nothing remains for adjudication in a plenary suit” and “such a suit ‘would be a 
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meaningless gesture.’”  Stern, 564 U.S. at 496 (quoting Katchen, 382 U.S. at 334).  And in 
Langenkamp, the Court noted that, because of the claimant’s filing of a proof of claim, “the 
ensuing preference action by the trustee” over which the bankruptcy court entered a final order 
“‘become[s] integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship.’”  Stern, 564 U.S. at 
497 (quoting Langenkamp, 498 U.S. at 44) (alteration in original)).   
Here, the Parish Lawsuits involve the same allegations and circumstances and seek 
recompense for the exact same harm as those alleged in the Tort Proofs of Claim.  The 
complaints against parishes are replete with allegations relating to the Archdiocese, including 
that the parishes were under the Archdiocese’s direct authority, control and province, and that the 
alleged perpetrator was employed by, an agent of, and under the Archdiocese’s direct 
supervision, employ and control.  The parishes have each asserted contribution claims in the 
bankruptcy, asserting that the Archdiocese is responsible for all of these claims. 
In other words, each facet of the Tort Claimants’ claims against the parishes, including 
the allegations, the evidence relating thereto, the alleged harm, and the allocation of fault 
between the Archdiocese and the parish, is already squarely before the Bankruptcy Court and 
will be addressed in the claims resolution process. 
Therefore, even if the channeling injunction constituted a final order on the parish claims 
(which it does not), such adjudication would be within the scope of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
constitutional authority.  See Stern, 564 U.S. at 497 (distinguishing Stern from Katchen and 
Langenkamp on the ground that jurisdiction was appropriate in those cases because the claims 
were part of the claims allowance process, whereas, as the Stern bankruptcy court found, the 
Stern claim “raises issues of law entirely different from those raise[d] on the [proof of claim].”). 
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III. UCC OBJECTION NO. 3 FAILS:  THE ARCHDIOCESE PLAN 
APPROPRIATELY TREATS CLASS 13 CLAIMS 
A. The Archdiocese Plan does not determine whether Class 13 Claims are 
“allowed” 
The UCC’s third objection must suffer the same fate as its second objection because it 
relies upon the false premise that the Archdiocese Plan “allows and channels all Class 13 
claims.”  UCC Memo at 14 (emphasis added).  That is not the case.  
Numerous Class 13 Claims were filed in this bankruptcy case.  Thus, the Archdiocese 
Plan necessarily provides treatment for Class 13 claims.  However, the Archdiocese Plan does 
not allow or disallow any claims.  Whether a claim is allowed or disallowed is determined by the 
Bankruptcy Court in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code.  Under section 502(a), for purposes 
of resolution, a claim or interest is deemed allowed unless a party in interest objects.  11 U.S.C. § 
502(a).  No party in interest has formally objected to any Class 13 Claim.  The Bankruptcy Court 
may also disallow a claim in accordance with other provisions of the Code, including section 
502(e), if appropriate.  Unless and until such claims are actually disallowed, they must be dealt 
with. 
B. Channeling the Class 13 Claims is necessary to preserve insurance coverage 
The treatment of Class 13 claims under the Archdiocese Plan is designed to preserve 
insurance coverage.  If contribution or indemnity claims relating to Tort Claims are not 
preserved, a non-settling parish carrier could assert that the parishes violated the cooperation 
clause in their policies by acquiescing in the impairment of the non-settling insurer’s subrogation 
claims against the Archdiocese.  See, e.g., Hoel v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 366 N.E.2d 901, 905 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (“The defendants would, of course, be substantially prejudiced if they could 
not be subrogated to a possible recovery from a third party for payments which they were 
required to make to their insured under the terms of their policy.”); Argiro v. Progressive Amer. 
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Ins. Co., 510 So. 2d 635, 635-36 (Fl. D. Ct. App. (3d) 1987) (insurer was prejudiced by waiver 
of subrogation rights in violation of cooperation clause). A material breach of the cooperation 
clause can void the policy.  Juvland v. Plaisance, 96 N.W.2d 537 (Minn. 1959).  If the non-
settling insurers were successful in advancing an argument that waiving contribution rights 
voided coverage, there would ultimately be less total insurance coverage available for the benefit 
of the Tort Claimants.16
This treatment of Class 13 claims tracks the treatment of asbestos-related contribution 
and indemnity claims under the plan approved in the API bankruptcy case.  See Third Amended 
Plan of Reorganization §§ 1.15, 1.75, 3.5, 12.3, In re API, Inc., No. Bky 05-30073, ECF No. 492 
(channeling liability for “Asbestos Claims,” which include contribution, indemnity, and 
subrogation claims (sub-defined as “Indirect Asbestos Claims”), to the Trust).  The UCC has not 
suggested any alternative treatment for these claims other than discharge. The treatment of these 
claims by the Archdiocese Plan is standard and appropriate. 
IV. UCC OBJECTION NO. 4 FAILS: PARISHES CANNOT BE TREATED AS 
INSIDERS FOR VOTING PURPOSES 
The UCC argues that the Archdiocese Plan cannot be confirmed because no non-insider 
class voted to accept the Archdiocese Plan.  UCC Memo at 16-19.  That is incorrect.  Class 9 – 
made up of trade vendor claims – also voted in favor of the Archdiocese Plan.  Regardless, 
Classes 3, 8, and 13 are not insiders of the Archdiocese and their votes all qualify as accepting 
classes under Section 1129(a)(10).  The UCC’s insider objection fails as a matter of law. At a 
minimum, the UCC’s attempt to determine insider status at this juncture is premature.   
16 While the Archdiocese does not anticipate any non-settling insurers under its plan, the 
settlements have not yet been approved and it is appropriate to address this contingency in the 
Archdiocese Plan. 
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A. The parishes are not statutory insiders of the Archdiocese as a matter of law 
Section 101(31)(B) defines the term “insider” for cases in which the debtor is a 
corporation.17  Section 101(31)(E) also includes “affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such 
affiliate were the debtor” as an insider.  The Bankruptcy Code defines “affiliate” in part as a 
“corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly 
owned, controlled, or held with power to vote [] by the debtor.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B).   The 
UCC alleges that the parishes are “insiders” of the Archdiocese based on the definition of 
affiliate.  UCC Memo at 16. 
The UCC’s initial premise fails plainly under the circumstances of this case.  Here, the 
concept of affiliation has not application because as non-profit religious entities, there are no 
“voting securities” or other parent-subsidiary economic interests at stake as between the 
Archdiocese and the parishes. 
The UCC cites only one case, In re Locke Mill Partners, 178 B.R. 697 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 
1995), in support of its position that the parishes are affiliates of the Archdiocese.  UCC Memo 
at 16-17.  In In re Locke Mill Partners, a dispute arose as to whether a condominium association, 
the only claim in Class A-3 of the debtor’s plan, was an insider.  Id. at 698.  The debtor 
designated four of the eight directors on the association’s board.  Id. at 699.  Moreover, the 
directors designated by the debtor and its predecessor “established the agendas for the meetings 
of the [association] Board, consistently voted together as a block vote and consistently initiated 
and prevailed on the matters of substance which were acted upon by the Board.”  Id. (emphasis 
17 Section 101(31)(B) provides that insiders of a debtor corporation include: “(i) director of the 
debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control of the debtor; (iv) partnership in which the 
debtor is a general partner; (v) general partner of the debtor; (vi) relative of a general partner, 
director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.”  The UCC does not allege that any class of 
creditors includes or is made up of these statutory insiders.  The parishes do not qualify under 
any of these relationships. 
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added).  One of the association board directors testified at a hearing that he “could not recall a 
single instance in which the Board had voted down a proposal or motion brought forward by the 
directors . . . selected by the Debtor.”  Id.  The facts of Locke Mill Partners are clearly 
distinguishable from those presented here. 
The UCC attempts to draw a parallel by claiming that, by way of the Archbishop and 
Vicar General, the Archdiocese “controls 60 percent of the parish boards.”  UCC Memo at 17.  
This is demonstrably untrue as applied to the plan process in this case.  The UCC’s selective 
citation to the record of a hearing held on May 7, 2015, for the proposition that the Archdiocese 
controls 60 percent of parish board fails to address the full context of the statements made and 
the parishes’ actual operations in relation to this bankruptcy case.  In fact, at that very same 
hearing, the Parish Group attorney made clear that neither the Archbishop nor the Vicar General 
have any say in such decisions:  
Because [the parish boards include the Archbishop and the Vicar General], the 
Archdiocese has agreed that the archbishop and the vicar general will have no say 
in anything to do with this bankruptcy case, so we are taking our direction from 
the parish priest, but more so from the lay trustees who are working with us for 
the most part.   
These people that are giving us direction are working for their parishes. Their 
focus is their parish, the people sitting in the pews. They are doing everything 
they can to make sure that their operations and the services they provide every 
day to their parishioners can continue, that’ s their goal. 
ECF No. 231 (Hr’g Transcript, May  7, 2015) at 15–16. 
The Archdiocese also made clear to the court and the UCC that “the Archbishop and 
Vicar General will not exercise the rights of a director to vote on or participate in the 
consideration of bankruptcy issues that may come before a parish board during the pendency of 
this case.”  ECF No. 172 (Archdiocese response to motion to appoint parish creditor committee) 
at 3. 
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There is no allegation that the Archbishop or Vicar General had any influence on any 
parish decisions when votes were cast.  Because the “determination of insider status should be 
made as of the time the vote is taken,” there can be no debate that the parishes cannot qualify as 
affiliates or insiders for the determination of insider voting status.  See In re Locke Mill Partners, 
178 B.R. at 702.   
This Court has also recognized the independence and separate status of parishes by 
providing for the formation of a Parish Committee represented by separate, independent counsel.  
The great majority of parishes have also separately retained independent counsel in connection 
with this bankruptcy case.  
Importantly, the UCC refers only to the statute setting forth the parameters for 
Archbishop and Vicar General involvement with parishes.  As has already been litigated in this 
case, the UCC’s improper conflation of the Archbishop and Vicar General with the Archdiocese 
is “neither factually nor legally correct.”  In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, 553 
B.R. 693, 702 n.1 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016), aff’d 562 B.R. 755 (D. Minn. 2016).  The UCC’s 
claim that the parishes are statutory insiders necessarily fails as a matter of law.     
B. The parishes and other non-debtor Catholic entities are not non-statutory 
insiders of the Archdiocese 
The circumstances in this case do not plausibly suggest non-statutory insider status 
between the Archdiocese and the parishes.  Regardless of whether this court views the issue as a 
purely fact issue or mixed issue of law and fact, the UCC has not, and cannot, assert any facts 
establishing insider status.   
In considering non-statutory insider status, courts examine whether: “(1) the closeness of 
[the creditor’s] relationship with the debtor is comparable to that of the enumerated insider 
classifications in § 101(31), and (2) the relevant transaction is negotiated at less than arm’s 
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length.”  In re The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2016).  Despite the 
UCC’s contrary contention, this court “cannot assign non-statutory insider status to a creditor 
simply because it finds the creditor and debtor share a close relationship.” Id. at 1001; see also 
Anstine v. Carl Zeiss Meditec AG (In re U.S. Med., Inc.), 531 F.3d 1272, 1277 (10th Cir. 2008).  
The point of Section 1129(a)(10) is to ensure that the relevant creditor “cast a vote 
formed on the independent judgment of what will best serve his interests…” In re Gilbert, 104 
B.R. 206, 210  (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).  For this reason, insider status should be determined at 
the time of voting, not at the time the debt arose.  See, In re Rexford Properties, LLC, 557 B.R. 
788 (C.D. Cal. 2016); see also, e.g., In re Featherworks Corp., 25 B.R. 634, 640 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[T]his Court is persuaded that what determines the right to vote is the status of 
the creditor at the time the vote is taken, not at the time the debt arises.”). 
As noted, the UCC cannot meet the first element of the insider test merely by showing 
close relationship between debtor and creditor.  Stated differently: 
“….the primary objective of Section 1129(a)(10)’s insider component is to 
forestall the voting of a creditor who is so beholden to or controlled by the debtor 
as to in effect be an alter ego of the debtor. Compare, In re Blesi, 43 B.R. 45, 48 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (stating that this is the aim of the insider exclusion for 
purposes of trustee elections under Section 702(a)). 
Gilbert, 104 B.R. at 210; see also In re Hartley, 52 B.R. 679, 690 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) 
(finding that  facts alleged “were not enough to prove the [creditor] was a mere instrumentality 
or alter ego of [debtor]”).  
Most of the allegations in the UCC’s current memorandum were taken directly from its 
failed motion for substantive consolidation.  In fact, many of the factors identified by the Court 
in its ruling on the UCC’s consolidation motion, including, for example, the absence of 
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commingling of assets and the existence of separate staff, property and bank accounts, preclude a 
finding of an alter ego relationship for voting purposes. ECF No. 739.18
Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that the plan and voting process was conducted 
on anything other than an arm’s length basis.  Again, the parishes are represented by separate 
counsel and by a separate committee.  There is nothing to suggest that the votes in this case were 
not properly authorized by each individual parish board. As acknowledged, the Archbishop and 
Vicar General played no role in parish voting on the Archdiocese Plan. There is no evidence 
suggesting that voting members of the parish classes did anything other than exercise 
independent judgment in voting on the Archdiocese Plan and that the vote reflects the best 
judgment and interests of the voting members of these classes.   
Finally, the UCC’s argument concerning the Archdiocese’s alleged “protection” of 
parishes in response to the UCC’s ill-conceived derivative standing motion has no bearing on the 
insider analysis and is demonstrably incorrect and has already been addressed by this court.  At 
the hearing on that motion, this Court stated that “the debtor’s decision not to sue was justified” 
and further remarked that the Archdiocese’s “ability to fund a plan depends on its viability and to 
the extent that you start sapping the assets in the cash reserves” by suing parishes “you’re hurting 
yourself.”  ECF No. 955 (Hr’g Transcript, January 12, 2017) at 100.  The Court also correctly 
noted that the Archdiocese “gets its money from the parishes and not only is there this problem 
with the parishes perhaps having an ability to pay, they have also already gone through a 
reluctance to pay as a result of this mess….”  Id. at 99-100.  This Court has determined that the 
18 See, e.g., In re Intelefilm Corp., 301 B.R. 327, 331-32 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003) (corporate veil 
may not be pierced under Minnesota law absent evidence that the entities failed to maintain the 
integrity of separate existence and the entities were operated as a constructive fraud or in an 
unjust manner). 
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Archdiocese’s actions with respect to avoidance actions were proper.  Id.; see also ECF No. 948 
(Order denying derivative standing motion). 
The parishes and other voting members of Classes 3, 8, and 13 cannot be treated as non-
statutory insiders.” 
V. UCC OBJECTION NO 5. FAILS: TRADE DEBT WAS APPROPRIATELY 
CLASSIFIED AS IMPAIRED 
The UCC cited two cases in support of its contention that the Archdiocese Plan 
artificially impairs trade vendor claims: In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127, 132 
(8th Cir. 1993) and In re Kellogg Square Partnership, 160 B.R. 343 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).  
UCC Memo at 19-21.  Both cases involved single asset real estate partnerships.  It appears that 
the debtors in these cases were organized as passive investment vehicles, that both debtors had 
few, if any, employees and that the asset owned by the respective debtors were in both cases 
subject to large (presumably non-recourse) mortgages.  In this sense, the two cases cited by the 
UCC did not involve a “business” of any sort. See generally David Gray Carlson, Artificial 
Impairment & the Single Asset Chapter 11 Case, 23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 339 (1974). 
Obviously, this case involves a “real” debtor with many employees, an extremely active 
role in the community, and “real” debts unrelated to the Tort Claims (including trade debt and 
parish and other obligations).  The UCC has not cited to a single case in which a court has 
applied an artificial impairment theory to an organization, whether non-profit or not, with 
operations anything like the operations conducted by the Archdiocese.  
Moreover, there is substantial doubt as to whether the artificial impairment theory in this 
context survived the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, which, among other changes, 
created an “exception for ‘cashed out’ claims and interests” from the definition of 
Case 15-30125    Doc 1131    Filed 08/04/17    Entered 08/04/17 15:02:38    Desc Main
 Document      Page 49 of 75
46 
impairment.  As indicated in In re Valley View Shopping Ctr., L.P., 260 B.R. 10, 32 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. 2001), the amendment to Section 1124:  
….suggests that even claims that are cashed out on the effective date of the plan 
can nevertheless be impaired within the meaning of § 1124.  Since the 
amendment, some courts continue to apply the doctrine of artificial impairment 
without addressing the effect of the 1994 amendments. But another line of cases 
that follows the solid analysis in In re Atlanta-Stewart Partners recognizes that 
with the deletion of the cash out exception, since classes that receive payment in 
full on the effective date of the plan are impaired, claims that are cashed out some 
time after the effective date must be impaired, as well… 
Id. (citing In re Atlanta-Stewart Partners, 193 B.R. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996)).  
This Court should follow Valley View and Atlanta-Stewart. 
Even if applicable, the question of whether a plan artificially impairs a class of creditors 
“for purposes of securing confirmation” is a fact issue to be determined at confirmation.  In re 
Windsor on the River Assocs., 7 F.3d at 132.  Courts in the Eighth Circuit have considered the 
existence of artificial impairment based, in part, on whether the debtor has provided a plausible 
or legitimate reason for the impairment or classification of such claims.  See id. at 133; see also 
In re Greenwood Point, LP, 445 B.R. 885, 909 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2011) (holding class was not 
artificially impaired because the debtor had a “good business reason to treat the claim as it did” 
and stating “[t]he fact that the Debtor ‘could’ have drawn upon other funds to pay the claim in 
full does not render the claim ‘artificially impaired.’”).   
The flexibility in classifying and treating claims necessarily precludes the presumption 
that artificial impairment is present. The Archdiocese made the prudent decision to defer 
payment of certain claims that legitimately can be deferred.  As the Court has recognized in other 
contexts, the Archdiocese generally does not have a legal right to funding from any source and 
must depend on the support of the faithful.  Although the Archdiocese will be able to satisfy the 
best interest test, the ultimate amount of cash that will be available remains somewhat uncertain.  
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Some or all of the Archdiocese’s available cash will be needed to pay administrative expenses 
and current operating expenses at the time of confirmation. 
The justification for the Archdiocese’s effort to defer certain payments has only become 
more pronounced since the Archdiocese filed its first plan over a year ago in May 2016.  Since 
that time, the UCC has caused the estate to incur huge professional fee obligations through its 
many ill-conceived and punitive attempts to punish the Archdiocese and other non-debtor 
Catholic entities.  The Archdiocese has been required to expend enormous resources responding 
to the UCC’s various motions, appeals, and fishing expeditions all while footing the bill for the 
UCC’s aggressive (and, in many cases, overly aggressive) actions.  It is also worth noting that 
the Archdiocese filed its amended plan shortly following entry of orders allowing interim 
compensation and reimbursement of expenses in the total amount of $4,143,702.90.  See ECF 
Nos. 852-858, 882.   
Even if the court determines that the impairment was not appropriate, the remedy 
imposed is simply to treat such creditors as unimpaired rather than to deny confirmation.  The 
evidence will show, however, that it is prudent to defer payments to Class 9 claims and not an 
unfair manipulation because its “pre-confirmation revenues and post-confirmation resources are 
properly committed to current costs of operation and to other purposes under” the Archdiocese 
Plan.19 See In re Kellogg Square P’ship, 160 B.R. at 361 (citations omitted).   Class 9 claims are 
properly treated as impaired.  
19 To support its claim that “[t]here is no logical justification” for suspended payment of Class 9 
claims, the UCC only cites to Exhibit B of the “Procedure for Requesting Counseling/Therapy 
Payment Assistance” in the Archdiocese Plan.  UCC Memo at 20 (citing Archdiocese Plan at 
131).  It is unclear how this Exhibit supports, or even relates to, the UCC’s argument.  
Accordingly, the Archdiocese reserves its right to readdress this argument at the appropriate 
time. 
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VI. UCC OBJECTION NO. 6 FAILS:  THE UCC HAS FAILED TO SHOW NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE 
According to the UCC, the Archdiocese has failed to comply with the applicable 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code by: (i) failing to conduct a sufficiently thorough review of 
potential avoidance actions, (ii) “obstructing” the UCC’s ability to obtain access to information 
relating to avoidance claims, and (iii) refusing to disclose parish financial information.  UCC 
Memo at 21-24.  Each of these objections has been addressed in prior proceedings in this case 
and thus are without merit as a matter of law.   
A. The Archdiocese’s actions with respect to avoidance claims were appropriate 
First, the UCC alleges that the Archdiocese failed to conduct an appropriate investigation 
of avoidance actions.  Although not clearly stated in its memorandum, the UCC appears to take 
the position that a debtor in possession is required to examine all of the debtor’s bank records, 
ledgers and other business and account documents in order to identify avoidance claims, even if 
the debtor has made the strategic business decision to forego litigation.  The UCC appears to take 
the further position that the failure to pursue such an investigation is evidence of bad faith in the 
plan process, even in a case in which the Court has, essentially, confirmed the debtor’s business 
judgment over the UCC’s objection. 
The UCC’s objection is untenable on its face. The simple truth is that the Bankruptcy 
Code does not impose a minimum level of investigation with respect to avoidance 
actions.  Contrary to the UCC’s suggestion, the appropriate level of investigation in a particular 
circumstance depends on the specific facts of the case. There is no requirement under the 
Bankruptcy Code that a trustee or debtor in possession continues its investigation once it 
determines in the reasonable exercise of the debtor’s judgment that it would not be advisable for 
the estate to pursue litigation.   
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As applied to this case, the Archdiocese determined prior to the expiration of the statute 
of limitations on avoidance claims that:  
….pursuing such claims would be unwise and not in the best interest of the estate 
based on: (a) the weak merits of such claims, (b) the likely defenses, (c) the 
uncertainly and unlikelihood of recovery, (d) the time and expense to the estate, 
(e) the fact that the debtor relies on these entities for support and needs ongoing 
contributions to fund the debtor’s ongoing operations under either plan, (f) the 
fact that the actions would create new creditors with claims against the estate, (g) 
the fact that any recovery on avoidance claims would be offset by the claims to be 
paid in full under either plan [see ECF No. 887], and (h) the fact that prosecution 
of avoidance claim for the delayed potential recovery of at most approximately 
$15 million (less attorney’s fees) could endanger recoveries already embodied in 
the Archdiocese Plan including the Parish insurance settlements (over $13.7 
million), the Riley Fund settlement (over $1.2 million), and the GIF compromise 
(between $5-6 million) along with other compromise issues including waiver of 
certain parish claims. .. 
ECF No. 930 at 10. 
The Archdiocese bolstered its position by a supporting declaration of its Chief Financial 
Officer in response to the UCC’s failed derivative standing motion.  ECF No. 931.  That 
declaration included over 100 pages of analysis, including a comprehensive and detailed 
summary of the specific claims sought to be pursued by the UCC.  Id.   Finally, the comments 
made by the Court at the hearing on January 12, 2017 provide additional support for the 
Archdiocese’s decision not to pursue avoidance claims in this case: 
There is no requirement in the bankruptcy code that a trustee or a debtor in 
possession bring every possible avoidance action.  All of them from 544, 547, 8, 
9, whatever they are, all say the trustee may avoid.  It’s a grant of right.  It is not a 
requirement that everyone – and no trustee does, no debtor in possession 
does.  There’s discretion granted to the decision maker on that, subject to what the 
Eighth Circuit has told us in Racing Services.  We’re sort of second guessing that 
judgment. 
ECF No. 955 (Hr’g Transcript, January 12, 2017) at 96.   As indicated in Section IV(B) above, 
the Court made specific reference to the Archdiocese’s legitimate interest in maintaining good 
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relations with the parties whose financial support will be critical to its reorganization.  See id. at 
99.  
This Court should decline the UCC’s request to revisit its failed derivative standing 
motion.  See ECF No. 906.  The UCC’s objection fails as a matter of law.  
B. The Archdiocese did not obstruct the UCC 
Next, the UCC claims that the Archdiocese “actively” obstructed the UCC’s ability to 
investigate potential avoidance claims.  UCC Memo at 22-23.  This contention is baseless.  There 
is no question that the UCC conducted a thorough independent investigation, as evidenced by the 
voluminous charts and documentation submitted by the UCC in support of its motion for 
derivative standing.  ECF Nos. 907, 908, 916 and 937.  The derivative standing motion 
ultimately filed by the UCC purported to cover several hundred separate transactions involving 
over 100 potential defendants.  The Archdiocese provided the UCC with access to the files, 
records, bank statements and ledgers requested by the UCC in connection with its investigation 
and spent well over 100 hours in responding to information requests made by the UCC in 
connection with its derivative standing motion.     
C. The Archdiocese acted appropriately with respect to non-debtor parish 
financial information 
The UCC’s remaining contention that the Archdiocese has wrongfully withheld parish 
financial information is equally flawed.  UCC Memo at 21-22.  The Archdiocese has made it 
clear from the beginning of this case that it is prepared to release any financial information in its 
possession concerning the parishes with the consent of the parishes or authorized by order of this 
Court.  The parishes, however, have opposed the release of financial information, and stated that 
they would hold the Archdiocese responsible for any release of information without their 
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consent.  In the meantime, for whatever reason, the UCC has failed to seek or obtain appropriate 
relief from this Court.   
Objection No. 6 is baseless and should be overruled on its face. 
VII. UCC OBJECTION NO. 7 FAILS: THE UCC HAS FAILED TO SHOW A 
COLORABLE BASIS FOR ATTACKING THE ARCHDIOCESE’S GOOD FAITH 
IN FORMULATING AND PROPOSING ITS PLAN 
A. Introduction 
The UCC’s original good faith objection was based, at least in part, on admittedly false 
statements of fact.  See ECF No. 1088.  The UCC’s attempt to save this objection through its 
“supplement” fails because the objection is still based on contentions that: (i) are not actionable 
as a matter of law; (ii) rely on arguments that were resolved by prior orders of this Court; (iii) are 
immaterial and irrelevant as a matter of law; or (iv) are grounded on demonstrably false 
allegations.  Given the facial, legal infirmity of this objection, it should be rejected as a matter of 
law. 
B. Prepetition Conduct 
1. The alleged prepetition conduct is irrelevant to the good faith analysis 
under Section 1129(a)(3) 
As a threshold matter, prepetition misconduct is not a cognizable basis for an objection to 
plan confirmation. 
Unlike the somewhat nebulous good faith filing doctrine, § 1129(a)(3) is a 
specific predicate which requires that a plan be “proposed in good faith and not by 
any means forbidden by law.”  Section 1129(a)(3)’s good faith test is more 
narrowly focused than the good faith filing doctrine, testing only “whether the 
debtor’s conduct in formulating, proposing, and confirming a plan displays the 
requisite honesty of intention.”  7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1112.07[6][b].  In 
narrowing this focus, courts do not consider the debtor’s motives for filing their 
petition when determining whether the plan fulfills the good faith requirement of 
§ 1129(s)(3). 
In re PPI Enters. (U.S., Inc.), 228 B.R. 339, 347 (Bankr. D. Del. 1998) (emphasis in original). 
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The cases cited by the UCC do not challenge this basic tenet.  Two of the cases cited by 
the UCC, In re Reuter, 427 B.R. 727, 770 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010), aff’d, 443 B.R. 427 (B.A.P. 
8th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 686 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2012) and In re LeMaire, 898 F.2d 1346, 1349 (8th 
Cir. 1990), dealt with individuals, as opposed to corporate, bankruptcy proceedings, whose 
claims could not be discharged in an individual Chapter 7 proceeding.  These cases have little, if 
any, relevance here.  Instead,  
In evaluating whether a plan has been proposed in good faith, the focus of the 
inquiry is the plan itself, which must be viewed based on the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the development and proposal of that plan. 
In re Am. Counsel Transp. Cos., Inc., 470 B.R. 478 (2012) (citation omitted); see also In re 
Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 426 (7th Cir. 1984) (bankruptcy court not required to 
conduct “an additional evidentiary hearing to determine if [debtor] originally filed its Chapter 11 
petition for reorganization in good faith”); In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 244 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1993). 
Accordingly, the UCC’s reliance on an alleged “pattern of prepetition conduct” as the 
cornerstone of its bad faith argument, UCC Memo at 25-26, is legally irrelevant and thus fails as 
a matter of law.   
2. The UCC’s allegations do not support a lack of good faith in filing the 
Archdiocese Plan 
It is clear that the UCC proposes to conduct discovery for transactions going back several 
decades in order to attack a plan filed by the Archdiocese in 2016 as part of what appears to be a 
continuing effort to harass the Archdiocese.  This Court should not countenance such conduct. 
It is also clear that the UCC’s allegations concerning the formation of various non-debtor 
Catholic entities and the relationship between the Archdiocese and those entities represent a re-
hash of the allegations made by the UCC in support of its failed motion for substantive 
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consolidation.  See ECF No. 631.  Again, it is clear that the UCC now wishes to litigate a claim 
that did not survive a motion to dismiss.  The UCC does not explain how this pre-petition 
conduct relates to the Archdiocese Plan.  In the event that discovery becomes necessary or 
appropriate, the Archdiocese is prepared to establish that the UCC’s claims are misplaced and 
that the underlying factual allegations are misstated or distorted.  They certainly have no 
connection to the Archdiocese Plan. 
The UCC has also alleged that the Archdiocese is somehow responsible for the diversion 
of approximately $7,800,000 of funds held in the AMBP.  UCC Memo at 28.  To put this in 
context, as indicated by the Archdiocese in its disclosure statement: 
In January 2014, the board of trustees provided participating employers with a 
20% billing credit due to a large reserve fund which had accumulated over time, 
which resulted in a return to participating employers of approximately 
$7,800,000.  Upon expiration of the credit in June 2015, the board of trustees 
authorized a reduction in premiums of 15%, resulting in a net increase in 
premiums of 5%.  Premiums have remained constant since June 2015, and the 
AMBP notified participants in the Health and Dental Plans that there would be no 
premium increase throughout calendar year 2016. 
Archdiocese Disclosure Statement at 19.   
The UCC has glossed over this history and has ignored the rapid and unexpected increase 
in medical costs experienced by all parties during the last few years.  As stated in the disclosure 
statement: 
The loss experience under the Health and Dental Plans changed dramatically 
following the Petition Date.  The Archdiocese believes that this change, which 
was not fully anticipated as of the Petition Date, is attributable, at least in part, to 
general economic and market conditions, including general trends relating to 
healthcare costs. 
Id. at 20. 
Two additional points must be emphasized with respect to the UCC’s criticism of the 
actions taken by the board of trustees of the AMBP: 
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First, the actions identified by the UCC, in fact, were taken by the AMBP’s board of 
trustees, and not by the Archdiocese.  The UCC obviously recognizes the distinction between the 
AMBP board of trustees and the Archdiocese.  The stipulation filed by the Archdiocese with 
respect to the AMBP, for example, was executed by legal counsel for the independent trustees of 
the AMBP.  ECF No. 1059.  The Archdiocese did not have any prior knowledge of the 
stipulation and had no involvement in the negotiation of the stipulation.  It is more than a little 
disingenuous for the UCC to claim that the Archdiocese is not responsible for a stipulation with 
the AMBP, but is entirely responsible for the premium decisions approved by the board on 
whose behalf the stipulation was negotiated. 
Second, as also indicated in the disclosure statement filed by the Archdiocese, “[o]nly 
approximately 5-7% of the funds held in the AMBP were contributed by the Archdiocese as a 
participant in the AMBP.”  Archdiocese Disclosure Statement at 19.  The stipulation referenced 
above appears to reflect the appreciation of the enormous hardship that would be suffered by 
participants in the AMBP if the proceeds of the AMBP somehow are required to be transferred to 
a trust for the benefit of Class 6 creditors.20  Again, it is more than a little disingenuous for the 
UCC to claim that the Archdiocese acted in bad faith by not requiring that its plan of 
reorganization be funded on the backs of the 3,500 participants in the AMBP program. 
Finally, UCC attacks the Archdiocese over its handling of the clergy abuse crisis.  Again, 
the UCC’s allegations relate to conduct going back decades.  Although the UCC has withdrawn 
its false allegation that the Archdiocese’s conduct resulted in a guilty plea, the UCC has not 
20 Although the stipulation also suggests that the UCC intends to seek recovery of those sums 
from the Archdiocese, which, presumably, would be forced to seek reimbursement of those 
amounts through increased parish assessments.  The stipulation appears to be perfectly circular in 
this regard.  The UCC’s new modified plan includes the AMBP as one of the assets to be valued 
by the Bankruptcy Court, without specifying the nature of the asset to be valued.  ECF No. 1129 
at Ex. C.   
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deviated from its apparent efforts to obtain retribution as opposed to fair compensation for the 
alleged prepetition conduct. 
The fact is that the Archdiocese has acknowledged that clergy abuse is wrong, wherever 
and whenever committed.  The UCC ignores the extraordinary efforts undertaken by the 
Archdiocese to protect children.  These efforts are described in detail in the Archdiocese 
disclosure statement and include, among other things, the adoption in 2002 of a Charter for the 
Protection of Children and Young People, the establishment of a safe environment training 
program, the public disclosure and identification of offending clergy members, the appointment 
in 2014 of a new director of ministerial standards and safe environment and the adoption and 
implementation of leading, state-of-the-art child protection policies and protocols.  In addition, 
as also indicated in the disclosure statement, the Archdiocese entered into a separate agreement 
with JAA in 2014 in connection with the settlement of the Doe 1 litigation.  Finally, most 
recently, the Archdiocese has entered into various settlement agreements with the Ramsey 
County Attorney’s Office to resolve both civil and criminal claims against the Archdiocese. 
Archdiocese Disclosure Statement at 18-21. 
In short, the UCC’s complaints with regard to prepetition conduct are without merit and 
are not relevant to a proper inquiry under Section 1129(a)(3)(c). 
C. Postpetition Conduct 
The UCC, of course, has also criticized certain aspects of the conduct by the Archdiocese 
during the pendency of this case.  Certain of these claims were or have been addressed in the 
foregoing section, including claims relating to the formation of certain non-debtor Catholic 
entities and the Archdiocese’s relationship with those entities, and the claim “that the Debtor 
divested nearly $8,000,000 in cash that could have been used to pay creditor claims in the 
months immediately preceding its bankruptcy case.”  UCC Memo at 31.  The Archdiocese has 
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also addressed the UCC’s allegations relating to the alleged failure to thoroughly investigate 
potential avoidance claims. 
The remaining allegations in the memorandum may be resolved in short order.   
As a threshold matter, the Archdiocese recognizes its obligation to act in good faith in 
connection with all matters relevant to the administration of the case.  At the same time, 
however, at least two of the claims asserted by the UCC—the Red Bull Crashed Ice event and 
the so-called “box of loot”—involve relatively small amounts, at least compared with a $156 
million plan of reorganization.  More importantly, the UCC’s claims with respect to these items 
are misleading at best.   
1. Red Bull Crashed Ice   
From at least 2012 to the present, the Archdiocese entered into a series of contracts with 
the promotors of the Red Bull Crashed Ice event providing for payment of $60,000 to $85,000 
each year.  Historically, the event has run from the steps of the Cathedral to city property 
adjacent to the Hayden Building.  The event draws large crowds.  The payments alleged by the 
UCC were intended to compensate the Cathedral for disruption to its operations and parking 
resulting from the event.  These were not funds historically retained by the Archdiocese. 
2.  “Box of Loot”   
This objection, it appears, relates to a letter filed on the docket in June 2016 alleging the 
existence of several hundred thousand dollars’ worth of jewelry and religious objects.  See ECF 
No. 687.  The Archdiocese conducted an investigation of the allegations made in the letter and 
provided the results of that investigation to the UCC, along with copies of the underlying 
appraisals, in June 2016.  The UCC did not object to the adequacy of the information provided 
by the Archdiocese.  The UCC’s eleventh-hour allegations are misguided.  
With regard to the UCC’s other claims of postpetition misconduct: 
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1. Sale of Property   
This objection is perplexing, given that the UCC participated in the sale process and, in 
fact, retained its own real estate expert with approval of this court.  See ECF No. 223.  The real 
estate sales were approved by this Court upon proper hearing based on verified pleadings from 
the Archdiocese and its real estate experts NorthMarq Real Estate Services, LLC.  Again, it 
appears that the UCC wishes to second-guess or re-litigate prior proceedings in the case.  These 
transactions cannot support a bad faith objection as a matter of law.  
2. Insurance Settlements 
The UCC next contends that the Archdiocese disregarded this Court’s mediation order, 
negotiated “collusive, under-market settlements with its insurance carriers”, and entered into 
such agreements “without creditor participation.”  UCC Memo at 30.  As a matter of law, this 
grievance is not a proper basis for a plan objection.  “In determining whether a plan has been 
proposed in good faith, a court is not required to review negotiations to determine the reasons 
that a consensual plan was not proposed.”  In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., Nos. 93 B 310, 93 B 
312, 93 B 313, 93 B 314, 93 B 315, 93 B 316, 93 B 318 and 93 B 319, 1993 WL 566565, at *38 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1993). “There is no good faith bargaining requirement [under § 
1129(a)(3)] in the sense of statutory ‘duty to bargain in good faith’ akin to that imposed under 
the labor laws in the Chapter 11 reorganization provisions.” In re New Hampshire Elec. Coop., 
Inc., 138 B.R. 668, 670 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992)). “A plan has not necessarily been proposed in bad 
faith simply because a party does not like the treatment of its claims.”  In re Envirodyne Indus., 
Inc., 1993 WL 566565, at *38  (citing In re Mulberry Phosphates, Inc., 149 B.R. 702, 708 
(Bankr. M.D. Fl. 1993); In re Montgomery Court Apartments of Ingham Cty. Ltd., 141 B.R. 324, 
330 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992)).  Thus, this basis for the UCC’s bad faith objection fails as a 
matter of law.  
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In any event, if necessary, the Archdiocese will demonstrate that the UCC’s contention 
regarding the insurance settlements are demonstrably false.  There was nothing collusive or 
unreasonable about these settlements.  The UCC and JAA had every opportunity to negotiate 
different deals if such deals could be concluded.  The settlements reached are fair, reasonable 
and completely above board. 
First, settlement negotiations were conducted entirely under the auspices of one of 
Minnesota’s most well regarded mediators, Hon. Arthur Boylan (ret.).  The UCC and JAA were 
invited (in fact, ordered) to attend virtually every one of the more than 20 days of negotiation 
sessions that took place from March, 2015 to November, 2016.  Second, the UCC and JAA both 
signed off on the amounts of settlements with five primary carriers.  See UCC Disclosure 
Statement at 20 (“The UCC has indicated its consent to the dollar amounts reached in five of the 
settlements.”)  This fact alone shows that the UCC and JAA had every opportunity to fully 
participate. 
It appears that the UCC and JAA’s accusation is that the settlements reached with 
second-layer carriers CNA, AIG, Aetna/Travelers and Interstate are too low.  The UCC and JAA, 
however, also fully participated in the negotiations with these four carriers.  As the Archdiocese 
will show if necessary, after over a year of three-way negotiations, it became clear that the UCC 
and JAA were not interested in reaching settlements with these four carriers.  At the same time, it 
was clear that these carriers were willing to pay very substantial sums – sums derived using the 
same method used to assess the appropriate amount that should be paid by the primary carriers, 
which were approved by the UCC and JAA.  It was only after the Archdiocese realized that the 
UCC and JAA did not want to settle that the Archdiocese began to consider settling with these 
carriers even if the UCC and JAA did not bless the deals.   
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The Archdiocese did not, in short, conclude deals behind the backs of either the UCC or 
JAA.  Rather, the Archdiocese made sure the UCC and JAA were aware of its intentions and 
gave them time to move negotiations with these carriers forward if they could, in which case the 
Archdiocese planned to stand down. 
Finally, the UCC’s recourse for its complaint regarding these settlements is to oppose 
approval of the agreements when the Archdioceses submits them for this Court’s approval.  As 
the Archdiocese will show, the settlement amounts are reasonable and far exceed the amounts 
paid by carriers in other diocesan and archdiocesan bankruptcies.  This is especially true where 
the number of claims subject to dismissal, discussed at Section I(C)(5) above, is taken into 
account.  The UCC and JAA’s suggestion that they could strike larger settlements is belied by 
the fact that after a year and a half of negotiations in which they fully participated, they failed to 
conclude deals with those carriers.  As far as litigating in the hope of obtaining more money, this 
would mean litigating not only with the carriers but also with all of the Tort Claimants, an 
expensive, painful and very time consuming process, with potentially worse results.21
In short, the settlement agreements will be addressed at the appropriate time and will be 
proven to be non-collusive, fair and reasonable and the best that could be achieved. The 
settlements show nothing more than the Archdiocese’s great efforts to fully resolve this case. 
21 Of course, the UCC and JAA had already criticized the Archdiocese’s first Plan of 
Reorganization in which claims against these carriers would be assigned to the Trust so that 
coverage with these carriers could be resolved through litigation – the same result the UCC Plan 
now seeks. See, e.g., JAA Press Release May 26, 2016, available at
http://www.andersonadvocates.com/Posts/News-or-Event/2119/Attorney-Jeff-Anderson-to-
Respond-to-Archdiocese-of-Saint-Paul-and-Minneapolis-Bankruptcy-Plan-Filed-Today-.aspx 
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3. Disposable Resources  
Finally, the UCC’s allegation that the Archdiocese has failed to remit all of its disposable 
resources to its plan is addressed in more detail in Section VII.B below.  As set forth elsewhere, 
this allegation is untrue as a matter of fact and a misstatement of the applicable law.22
D. Conclusion 
As has become typical in this case, the UCC’s claim of bad faith is long on invective and 
short on factual support and analysis.  Moreover, the UCC’s allegations of bad faith ring more 
than a little hollow in light of a series of questionable and overly aggressive actions on the part of 
the UCC, including its recent decision to submit a “modified” plan despite the court’s 
admonition against creating a “moving target.”  The simple truth is that the conduct alleged by 
the UCC will not support a finding of bad faith within the meaning of Section 1129(a)(3).  The 
court should overrule the UCC’s bad faith objection as a matter of law. 
VIII. UCC OBJECTION NO. 8 FAILS:  THE ARCHDIOCESE IS ENTITLED TO 
UTILIZE 11 U.S.C. § 1129(B) TO CONFIRM A PLAN OVER AN NON-
CONSENTING CLASS’S OBJECTION 
A. The Archdiocese Plan is fair and equitable and the Archdiocese has complied 
with all requirements under Section 1129(b)(2) 
Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that if all applicable requirements of 
section 1129(a) are met, then, notwithstanding an impaired class of claims that has not voted to 
accept the plan, the plan may still be confirmed so long as it does not discriminate unfairly and is 
“fair and equitable with respect to a class . . . of unsecured creditors.”  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). 
Section 1129(b)(2) provides that a plan is fair and equitable with respect to a class of unsecured 
22 This Court has previously indicated that the obligation of a chapter 7 trustee to collect and 
reduce to money the property of the estate for which such trustee serves, and close such estate as 
expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of the parties in interest, 11 U.S.C. § 
704(a)(1), is simply not applicable in a chapter 11 proceeding. ECF No. 1095 (Hr’g Transcript, 
June 15, 2017) at 27-28. 
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claims if (i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receives or retains on 
account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the 
allowed amount of the claim , or (ii) it provides that the holder of any claim in a class junior to 
the claims or interests of that particular class will not receive or retain under the plan on account 
of such junior claim or interest in property. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B). Importantly, 
however, the “absolute priority rule” does not apply to non-profit debtors like the Archdiocese. 
See, e.g., Matter of Wabash Valley Power Assn., 72 F.3d 1305, 1318–19 (7th Cir. 1995); In re 
Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890, 265 F.3d 869, 873 (9th Cir. 2001).  
The UCC does not argue otherwise. 
The UCC instead asserts that confirmation of the Archdiocese Plan would be unfair 
because Tort Claimants have not voted in favor of the plan.  UCC Memo at 32-33.  “As with 
many other provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129, satisfaction of [the ‘fair and equitable’] requirement 
depends on specific facts.”  In re Montgomery Court Apartments, 141 B.R. at 346.  The standard 
for a confirmation of a debtor’s plan is flexible.  In re Spanish Lake Assocs., 92 B.R. 875, 878 
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (“Such flexibility was legislated into the Bankruptcy Code by the very 
fact that terms such as ‘fair and equitable’ resist precise definition.”).  Ultimately, the “fair and 
equitable” decision is within the court’s discretion  Id. (“Thus, a plan which satisfies the 
standards set forth in § 1129(b)(2) may or may not be ‘fair and equitable.’”).  In deciding 
whether the Archdiocese Plan meets the standards set forth in Section 1129(b)(2), “the Court 
should view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts and matters contained in the Plan and 
the Disclosure Statement in a light most favorable to the [Archdiocese].”  Id. at 877. 
As a preliminary matter, the Class 6 vote tallies may be in doubt based on the 
misrepresentations made by the UCC and claimants’ counsel in this case.  See ECF No. 1086 at 
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3–5.  The Archdiocese has expressly reserved the right to seek a designation of votes under 
Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.  In the meantime, most of the cases cited by the UCC 
are inapposite.  
In In re D & F Const. Inc., for example, the court noted that the debtor’s plan was not fair 
and equitable as a result of imposing a negative amortization on a single loan.  865 F.2d 673, 
675-76 (5th Cir. 1989).  This negative amortization would have forced the creditor to, in effect, 
“make a post-confirmation loan to the debtor for a period of twelve years.”  Id.  There is nothing 
similar to that happening in the Archdiocese Plan with respect to Class 6 claimants.  In fact, the 
Plan provides a fair process by which Class 6 claimants would have their claims independently 
evaluated and paid.  See supra Sections I–III, VII.23  Despite the UCC’s assertion, the value of 
Class 6 claims is not fixed and the trust established by the Archdiocese Plan includes a process 
for determining the reasonable value of these claims.  As detailed above, Class 6 claims should 
not be taken at face value. 
While the UCC cites only to an unreported case from New Mexico for a list of factors to 
be considered in determining whether the “fair and equitable” standard has been met, that case 
specifically listed these factors for a determination under Section 1129(b)(1) “with respect to a 
dissenting class of secured creditors.”  In re Cottonwood Corners Phase V, LLC, 2012 WL 
566426, at *22 (Bankr. D. N.M. Feb. 17, 2012) (emphasis added).  In contrast, courts have 
recognized that some of the factors to be analyzed with respect to a dissenting unsecured creditor 
are:  
(1) whether the statutory requirements of section 1129(b)(2) have been met;  
(2) whether the length of time for proposed repayment is reasonable;  
23 These sections also address the UCC’s unsupported arguments in this objection regarding the 
lack of good faith by the Archdiocese and the “collusive, under-market insurance settlements.” 
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(3) whether the percentage or formula for proposed payment demonstrates a good 
faith effort to repay those obligations;  
(4) whether the primary risk of reorganization remains with the equity interests of 
the reorganized debtor; and  
(5) whether other particular inequities are inherent in the plan, including special 
prejudice to a dissenting class arising from its particular circumstances. 
In re Renegade Holdings, Inc., 429 B.R. 502, 529 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2010) (new trial granted on 
other grounds) (citing In re Montgomery Court Apartments, 141 B.R. at 346).   
Notably, the UCC does not address these factors, likely because examination of the 
Archdiocese Plan reveals compliance with each.  At base, this determination is a fact issue that 
cannot be resolved at this time. 
Additionally, despite the UCC’s hyperbole, there is nothing to support the notion that that 
the Archdiocese is seeking to “undermine the rights of clergy abuse survivors.”  See UCC Memo 
at 34.  The Archdiocese has devoted all of its available resources to equitably resolve all Class 6 
claims.  As detailed in the Archdiocese Disclosure Statement, the Archdiocese will fund the Plan 
Implementation Account with: (1) cash consisting of non-restricted cash accounts, the account 
established to hold the proceeds derived from the sale of Archdiocese properties during the 
course of this case, and the proceeds of the Riley Fund dispute; (2) cash from the sale of jewelry 
and other items not necessary for continued operations and that lack liturgical or historical value; 
(3) the assignment of Archdiocese interests in Ausmar and the residual Ward estate; (4) 
Archdiocese Settling Insurer contributions; (5) the GIF contribution; (6) contributions from 
Catholic Entities; and (7) $500,000 to establish a counseling fund.  See Archdiocese Plan § 5.1.  
All told, the Trust will initially collect approximately $148 million in cash, plus allowed claims 
totaling $14.2 million in the Home liquidation.  Any asset or cash kept by the Archdiocese will 
be necessary for the continued operation of the Archdiocese as a going concern.   
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The UCC has not presented any evidence that the Archdiocese has “minimized” assets 
available to satisfy claims.  To the contrary, the Archdiocese has committed available assets to 
the Trust, maximized its insurance recoveries, and established a fair process for evaluating and 
paying all Class 6 claims.  The alternative to a determination that the confirmation of the 
Archdiocese Plan over a Class 6 objection is fair and equitable is years of litigation likely 
resulting in many Class 6 claimants receiving nothing and leaving the Archdiocese wholly 
insolvent while potentially forcing parishes into bankruptcy.24  As a result, this court should 
make a determination that the Archdiocese Plan is fair and equitable, thus allowing for “cram 
down” under Section 1129(b)(2). 
B. The best interest test does not require that the Archdiocese “contribute the 
liquidation value of its assets” as a condition to confirmation 
The UCC Memo alleges that the Archdiocese must “contribute the value of its assets” in 
support of its contention that the Archdiocese Plan may not be confirmed over the objection of 
Class 6 creditors.  According to the UCC, “[i]f confirmed, the Debtor’s Plan would permanently 
terminate the Debtor’s liability for approximately $1.5 billion in clergy abuse claims and the 
Debtor’s Plan does not even require the Debtor to contribute the liquidation value of its assets – 
as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) – in exchange for such sweeping relief.”  UCC Memo at 
24 See also ECF No. 821 (Hr’g Transcript, November 10, 2016) at 57–58 for a discussion about 
the implications of not maximizing its insurance recoveries through global settlements with the 
Parishes and insurance companies: 
A go-it-alone plan with the Archdiocese only assets that invites years of litigation 
involving individual parishes who may or [may] not retain contribution indemnity 
claims against the Archdiocese but who presumably, for which presumably will 
continue to be members of the Catholic family, will continue to be part of the 
Archdiocese, whose assessments are necessary to fund the Archdiocese.  A go-it-
alone plan raises a specter of years of litigation and puts parishes, the Archdiocese 
and everybody else in an adverse relationship for probably many years. 
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34.  The UCC also alleges that the Archdiocese failed “to contribute the liquidation value of its 
assets” as a basis for its objection to the Archdiocese plan on good faith grounds.  Id.
The UCC has misstated the applicable test.  The statutory provisions cited by the UCC 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests – 
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class – 
(i)  has accepted the plan; or 
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan an account of such 
claim or interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, 
that is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain 
if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date. 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). 
As the statutory language makes clear, Section 1129(a)(7)(A) does not require payment 
of any amount as part of the confirmation process.  Contrary to the UCC’s suggestion, the 
Section 1129(a)(7) test is purely hypothetical.  See, e.g., In re Lisanti Foods, Inc., 329 B.R. 491, 
500 (D.N.J. 2005) (“The application of the best interests test … involves a hypothetical 
application of chapter 7 to a chapter 11 plan.”) (emphasis added).  In other words, a bankruptcy 
court is required to “conjure up a hypothetical liquidation and distribution analysis” to determine 
compliance with Section 1129(a)(7).  In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. 168, 172 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
1997); see also In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 141 (D. Del. 2012) (same).  
The Archdiocese submitted a thorough and detailed hypothetical liquidation analysis as 
part of the disclosure process.  Archdiocese Disclosure Statement at Ex. C.25  The UCC’s 
original objection included a general allegation that the Archdiocese has failed to meet the best 
25 Given the paucity of authority in this area, the Archdiocese reserves argument on whether the 
best interest test is applicable under any circumstances, in light of the prohibition in Section 
1112(c) on the conversion of a non-profit debtor without the consent of the debtor. 
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interest test.  ECF No. 1074 at 2.  The UCC’s supporting memorandum, however, fails to 
provide any significant detail with respect to the legal basis for its objection. 
The evidence to be submitted at confirmation will show compliance with the hypothetical 
test of Section 1129(a)(7) under any reasonable standard. At the same time, any reasonable 
analysis of the best interest test should begin with a recognition  that “[l]iquidating a nonprofit 
enterprise is complicated and, in some instances, arguably prohibited by both the Bankruptcy 
Code and applicable nonprofit law….”  Andrew M. Troop, et al., Reorganizing with Value but 
without Profit (or Equity); Select Confirmation Issus for Nonprofit Entities, 19 Norton J. of 
Bankr. & Prac. 147, 154 (2010).  Indeed, the analysis becomes more difficult in the context of a 
church reorganization: 
For example, a religious nonprofit may have unique real property, such as a 
church, temple or cemetery, for which the forced liquidation value could be lower 
because of the property’s limited alternative-use potential, or the restrictive 
zoning associated with the site.  Moreover, the intangible assets of some 
charitable or religious nonprofits, such as their ability to attract donations based 
on their “brand” or the “goodwill” associated with their charitable works (or 
unique intellectual property), may have a limited or nonexistent forced liquidation 
value due to the limited number of buyers and the asset’s lack of market 
portability.  The end result is that many of the assets owned by a nonprofit could 
have a very low forced liquidation value for the purposes of the best-interest test, 
which, in turn, would lower the minimum distribution level a plan proponent 
would have to satisfy to obtain confirmation.  Thus, in a nonprofit’s chapter 11 
case, the best-interest test will likely be lowered due to the nature of the debtor 
and its assets. 
Kavita Gupta, Confirmation Issues Facing a Nonprofit Debtor, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Apr. 2012, at 
32; see also In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc., 388 B.R. 202 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
2008) (overruling a plan objection based on the best interest test and finding the testimony and 
evidence submitted by the plan proponent sufficient “considering the unique nature of the Debtor 
as a non-profit organization dependent on contributions that are voluntary and may be restricted, 
and of the Debtor’s other assets”).  
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Given the unique circumstances of this case, the Court should also consider the broader 
interests of creditors in applying the best interest test, as is required in connection with the best 
interest test of Chapter 9.  See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (“the court shall confirm the plan if … the 
plan is in the best interest of creditors and is feasible”).  Obviously, the language of the two 
sections is different.  However, the Archdiocese’s situation in this regard is closer to a municipal 
bankruptcy proceeding than a typical Chapter 11 business reorganization.  
As indicated in one of the leading cases in the area: 
[While the best interests of the creditors test is an elusive standard in Chapter 9], 
nevertheless the concept is not without meaning….  The concept should be 
interpreted to mean that the plan must be better than the alternative that creditors 
have.  In the chapter 9 context, the alternative is dismissal of the case, permitting 
every creditor to fend for itself in the race to obtain the mandamus remedy and to 
collect the proceeds….  [The courts] must apply the test to require a reasonable 
effort by the municipal debtor that is a better alternative to the creditors than 
dismissal of the case. 
In re Cty. of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1020 (Bankr. C.D. Ca. 1996) (quoting 4 Collier on 
Bankruptcy, ¶ 943.03(7) (15th ed. 1995)).  
Again, the Archdiocese Plan meets the requirements of Section 1129(a)(7) with or 
without regard to the broader interests of creditors and other parties interest. For the reasons 
suggested above, however, it is appropriate for this Court to consider the true alternatives to the 
Archdiocese Plan as part of the confirmation process.  As previously indicated, these alternatives 
include many years of speculative litigation, massive disruptions to the mission of the church, 
interference with the expectations of donors and the Faithful, and, presumably, additional 
Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings.  As a practical matter, it is difficult to imagine 
alternatives to the Archdiocese Plan that would be in the best interest of any party. 
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In sum, the best interests of creditors test does not require payment of any amount as part 
of the confirmation process and does not preclude confirmation of the Archdiocese Plan over the 
objection of Class 6 creditors. 
OTHER PLAN OBJECTIONS 
A. Mortgage Lenders 
As indicated in prior pleadings, two of the high schools located in the Archdiocese are 
subject to mortgages in favor of North American Banking Company (with respect to Totino-
Grace High School), and Bremer Bank National Association (with respect to Benilde-St. 
Margaret High School).  The mortgage holders have filed objections to the Archdiocese Plan 
[ECF Nos. 1101 and 1103] on the grounds that the plan does not explicitly retain the mortgage 
liens, even though, as acknowledged by Bremer, the underlying property is not “dealt with in the 
plan.” ECF No. 1103. 
The Archdiocese has made it clear to the mortgage lenders that it intends and expects that 
the mortgages on the high schools will ride through the bankruptcy.  The Archdiocese, of course, 
has not challenged the mortgage liens during the pendency of this case.  In fact, any such 
challenge would be inconsistent with the assumption by the Archdiocese of the underlying 
leases. 
In any event, the Archdiocese is prepared to file a supplemental Plan Document in 
accordance with Section 14.2 of the Archdiocese Plan to confirm its earlier representation and to 
eliminate any conceivable question as to its intention to preserve the mortgage lien on the high 
schools following confirmation.26  The Archdiocese has deferred filing the supplement pending 
26 Section 14.2 of the plan provides in relevant part as follows:  “Except as provided in the Plan 
or the confirmation order, the Reorganization Assets shall vest in the Reorganized Debtor (or 
such other entity or entities specified by the Debtor in a Supplemental Plan Document, and 
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the hearing scheduled for August 29 in light of this Court’s prohibition on the filing of exhibits, 
affidavits or other evidence in support of its response. See ECF No. 1090.  
The NABC and Bremer objections should be overruled on the basis of the representations 
referenced above and the supplement to be filed  by the Archdiocese. 
B. Deceased Claimant 
The Estate of Nancy J. Galatowitsch (the “Estate”) has objected to provisions of the plan 
dealing with the treatment of deceased claimants.  ECF No. 1105.  The Estate’s objection 
implicates Section 4.2(a) of the Trust Distribution Plan, which provides, in relevant part: 
The Tort Claims Reviewer shall consider, before assessing the Tort Claim, 
whether the Tort Claimant has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that: (1) the Abuse was perpetrated by a person for whose actions the Protected 
Parties are liable in whole or in part; and for all Tort Claims filed after the Claim 
Filing Date, (2) that the Tort Claimant’s failure to timely file a proof of claim by 
the Claim Filing Date is excused under Minn. Stat. § 541.15 (or other applicable 
law suspending the limitations period, if any).  In order to be eligible for 
participation and claim liquidation under the TDP, each Tort Claimant must be 
alive as of the date of Plan Confirmation. 
Archdiocese Plan at 111.   
The Estate’s objection should be overruled.  First, the objection and supporting 
memorandum were filed by Paul and Dennis Galatowitsch as “Pro Se litigants on behalf of the 
Estate of Nancy Joan Galatowitsch.” ECF No. 1105.  The Archdiocese does not know if the pro 
se litigants, in fact, are attorneys.  If so, the attorneys have not been admitted in this proceeding.  
Alternatively, the Archdiocese is also unaware of any authority under which a non-attorney may 
act as a “pro se litigant” on behalf of a party in interest (in this case, the Estate of Galatowitsch).   
The Estate’s objection also fails on the merits.  Minnesota law does not recognize claims 
of the type asserted by the Estate following the death of the claimant.  See Minn. Stat. § 573.01 
subject to approval by the Bankruptcy Court at the confirmation hearing) on the Effective Date 
free and clear of all liens, claims, and interests of creditors, including successor liability claims.”   
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(2016) (“a cause of action arising out of an injury to the person dies with the person of the party 
in whose favor it exists, except as provided in section 573.02”); Beaudry v. State Farm Mut. Auto 
Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1994) (uninsured motorist claim, filed against carrier three days 
before plaintiff’s death, abated upon death of plaintiff along with her underlying claim against 
tortfeasor and did not survive as a contract claim), abrogated on other grounds by Oanes v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. 2000).   
The result mandated by state law is fair and equitable under the circumstances.  
Compliance with the law ensures that any assets that would otherwise go the Estate will go to 
living claimants.  The Estate’s objection should be overruled. 
C. Crosier Entities 
The Crosier objection is based on general equitable considerations.  ECF No. 1120.  As 
such, the Archdiocese does not believe that the objection states a legal basis for entry of an order 
denying confirmation of the Archdiocese Plan.  The Archdiocese, however, has been in 
discussions with counsel for the Crosier entities and believes that it is likely that the concerns 
expressed by these entities will be resolved following expiration of the claim deadline in the 
Crosier bankruptcy case and as part of  the plan confirmation process in the Crosier case. The 
Archdiocese acknowledges the fiduciary obligations of the Crosier debtors and has agreed that it 
will not seek an order overruling the objection at this time, with a reservation of rights for all 
parties. 
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For the forgoing reasons, this Court should overrule each of the UCC’s and other plan 
objectors’ objections to the Archdiocese Plan. 
Respectfully submitted,  
BRIGGS AND MORGAN 
Dated:  August 4, 2017 BY: /e/ Richard D. Anderson 
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